Sunday, October 7, 2018

Postscript to African Aid vs Development #2 of 3. A Brief Exchange: Dambisa Moyo and Economic Development vs Kumi Naidoo and Reparations for Colonialism

Click here to read the original Cautious Optimism Facebook post with comments

2 MIN READ - The Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs and Other Egghead Stuff continues his series of quick read postcripts on the problems with Africa's economic development or lack thereof.




(This is the second in a series of three short postscripts to October’s detailed interview with Dambisa Moyo expounding her critique of and alternative to the failed seventy-year African aid model. To read the original article visit the link at the end of this column.)

Dambisa Moyo: “Well I think first of all it’s a great shame that African governments were not… actually not just African governments… global policymakers were not operating with the anticipation that one day Africa would be required to stand on its own two feet which is why we’re in this situation where African governments in many cases are 70 percent or even higher dependent on aid. The fact of the matter is aid has not worked.

The original architects of aid had two goals in mind—one was to deliver growth and number two was to alleviate poverty and on those two metrics it’s absolutely failed. The expectation that Africa and Africans should sit back and expect the world to step in and help them is completely absurd and as far as I’m concerned it’s really the root of the problem that we’re seeing right now.”

Kumi Naidoo: “But that presumes that what we are asking for is charity. What we are asking for is justice. Let’s be very clear that Africa and the rest of the developing world have not been compensated properly for the injustices of colonialism. Africa is one of the richest continents underneath the ground and precisely for that reason we are one of the poorest continents above the ground, and right now we are saying… …we need the aid modalities to be reformed. Conditionalities that rich countries put as burdens on developing countries need to be addressed…”

BBC moderator to Moyo: “Without aid what will happen?”

Dambisa Moyo: “Well what I think will happen is we’ve seen in other places in the world where emerging countries have actually been able to achieve double-digit economic growth when they actually take another approach. They focus on building their economies through jobs and entrepreneurship and they encourage their economies—the private sector of their economies to grow...

...This whole notion of focusing on colonialism in Africa’s past, it will always be part of Africa’s past. India was also colonized and yet we don’t sit around feeling sorry for India and neither do we hear Indians on the global stage saying we want to be compensated. You get on with it. It’s been 50 years since many African countries were given independence. You know personally I don’t want to sit around for another 10, 20, 30 years hearing Africa whinge about the fact that they were colonized. It’s time to move on.”

Dambisa Moyo is a Zambian economist with degrees from American University (BS, MBA), Harvard University (MPA), and University of Oxford (PhD). She was a consultant at the World Bank for African development and Head of Economic Research and Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa at Goldman Sachs. Her book “Dead Aid” argues that the seventy-year aid model has failed Africa and the continent must focus instead on the international bond market and capital investment as a long-term solution.

Kumi Naidoo is an African human rights activist who has served as International Executive Director of Greenpeace, Secretary General of Global Call to Action Against Poverty, and is currently Secretary General of Amnesty International.

ps. To read Dambisa Moyo's original Guernica interview on what's wrong with an aid model that she says keeps Africa trapped in poverty go to:


Friday, October 5, 2018

Postscript to African Aid vs Development #1 of 3. Bill Gates vs Kumi Naidoo vs Bono. Only one of these three actually gets it.

Bono: "Capitalism takes more people out of poverty than aid."


2 MIN READ - The Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs and Other Egghead Stuff offers his series of quick read postcripts on the problems with Africa's economic development or lack thereof.

U2's Bono and Prof. George Ayittey

(This is the first in a series of three short postscripts to September's detailed interview with Dambisa Moyo expounding her critique of and alternative to the failed seventy-year African aid model. To read the original article visit the link at the end of this column.)

Zambian economist and Africa aid critic Dambisa Moyo has been dubbed the “anti-Bono” for criticizing glamour-seeking music celebrities who promote the expansion of what she considers a failed aid model that keeps Africa mired in poverty.

As we know most music celebrities are narcissistic economic illiterates. And U2’s Bono was at the epicenter of the so-called Glamour-Aid movement, making a second career out of public appeals for increased aid for over two decades.

But in a positive surprise Bono has proven to be one of the rare celebrities who is open to learning new ideas. On a 2007 Africa tour he met Ghanan economist and Independent Institute Fellow George Ayittey who discussed the real long-term solution to African poverty: global capital markets and foreign investment. Bono was skeptical at first (why not, the message contradicted the aid narrative he had preached for over 20 years) so Ayittey gave the rock superstar a copy of his book “Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Development.”

It appears Bono was a devout student who took his assignment seriously:

“In a speech at Georgetown University, Bono altered his economic and political views and declared that only capitalism can end poverty.”

The details of Bono's interaction with Ayittey and change of heart are available at...

http://blog.independent.org/2013/08/12/bono-capitalism-takes-more-people-out-of-poverty-than-aid/

Although many of Bono’s political views remain center-left, he has exhibited a trait that few self-obsessed rock stars and Hollywood actors possess: teachability. And he had the wherewithal to embrace what works instead of what simply sounds good—even after espousing the feelgood celebrity soundbite for the better share of his adult life—and making a courageous u-turn towards free markets and commercial investment.

ps. The Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs highly recommends viewing the one minute YouTube of Bono embedded in the enclosed article.

pps. To read Dambisa Moyo's original Guernica interview on what's wrong with an aid model that she says keeps Africa trapped in poverty go to:


Saturday, September 22, 2018

Quick News Flash: China Announces Broad Import Tax Cut

Click here to read the original Cautious Optimism Facebook post with comments

A quick news flash from the Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs and Other Egghead Stuff.

Interesting news on the trade/tariff front.
"China Plans Broad Import Tax Cut as Soon as October"
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-20/china-is-said-to-plan-broad-import-tax-cut-as-soon-as-october-jma3g8jg

This could turn out to be just a head fake, but the relative silence from most of the mainstream media suggests that the timing and coincidence with President Trump's recent tariff pressure isn't, well, just a coincidence.

Will be watching to see if this develops further.

Thursday, September 20, 2018

The Obama recovery: How does it compare to America’s previous post-crisis expansions?


10 MIN READ - The Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs and other Egghead Stuff grades former President Obama’s economic recovery on a bell curve against 225 years of other financial crises. You’ll feel like you’ve moved up the bell curve a little after enjoying this in-depth article.




Former President Barack Obama recently re-entered the economic debate forum when he gave a speech taking credit for America’s greatly improved GDP numbers and employment performance of the last 18 months. Addressing the lackluster GDP and employment performance while he was in office, Obama reminded listeners once again that he inherited an economy just emerging from a financial crisis and in recession when he took office in 2009, but that his economic policies produced a strong recovery given the circumstances.

While there’s no question that Obama entered office right on the heels of a major financial crisis and inherited an economy in sharp recession, he wasn’t the first president to deal with such problems. The United States has suffered approximately 19 financial crises since George Washington assumed office in 1789, each followed by sharp recessions which were called “depressions” before economists changed their language after the Great Depression. 

Previous presidents who have been forced to deal with depressed post-crisis economies include George Washington (Panic of 1792), John Adams (1797), James Monroe (1819), Martin van Buren (1837), James Buchanan (1857), Ulysses Grant (1873), Grover Cleveland/William McKinley (1893), Theodore Roosevelt/William Howard Taft (1907), Warren Harding (1921), Franklin Roosevelt (1933) and George H.W. Bush/Bill Clinton (1990) to name some notable examples.

President Obama had a full eight years from 2009 to 2017 to oversee a post-crisis economic reconstruction, and both he and his supporters claim he took a difficult situation and engineered a miraculous recovery. But given what we know historically about how the economy rebounded from other financial crises, just how well does Obama’s miracle stack up?

Before we compare, it’s worth noting that defining a financial crisis is somewhat subjective, but economists generally agree that a crisis is characterized by widespread contraction of bank lending/credit, bank failures, in the pre-Fed era by widespread suspension of banknote/deposit redemption, and in the pre-WWII era by rapid price deflation. 

By those criteria the largest crises are typically viewed as the Panics of 1797, 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893, 1907, 1920-21, the four Great Depression panics in 1930, 1931, 1933, and 1937 (1933 being the greatest banking panic in U.S. history where thousands of banks failed), the 1990 S&L Crisis, and 2008. There were smaller “incipient” panics during the National Banking System era of 1862-1913 (1884, 1890, 1901) and one at the outbreak of the Civil War (1861) which I ignore here.


I. UNEMPLOYMENT

If we measure the length of time required from the panic/crisis itself to the point where “full employment” is re-established (defined by most economists as a 5% unemployment rate or lower), the Obama recovery took exactly seven years. The crisis itself struck in September of 2008 and in September of 2015 the Bureau of Labor Services reported America’s official unemployment rate had finally fallen to 5.0%.

The longest recovery from a major crisis to full employment is undoubtedly the Great Depression. Unemployment peaked in the same year as the great 1933 crisis (at 25%) and full employment wasn’t reached until 1942 marking a nine year recovery. However in 1942 the military was in the process of drafting 12 million men to fight overseas so many economists don’t view voluntary full civilian employment materializing until 1946, thus concluding a thirteen year recovery.

Unemployment statistics before 1929 are very hard to pin down since the government didn’t begin collecting such data until the Great Depression. However economic historians such as Stanley Lebergott and Christina Romer have toiled for years trying to calculate estimates based on metrics like bank deposit records, government budgets, and payrolls in industrial centers.

The data conclude that after the Great Depression, the longest employment recoveries occurred during the depressions after the Panics of 1837 and 1893. 

The Depression of 1893 is itself considered the second-worst slump in American history and was dubbed “The Great Depression” by Americans until the real Great Depression struck in 1929. Hundreds of banks failed (an enormous number for the 1890’s), foreign investors pulled their capital out of the country, unemployment reached 12.4% (Romer) after a second, smaller crisis struck in 1896, and the U.S. Treasury itself barely avoided bankruptcy with a bailout loan from J.P. Morgan.

And both the Depressions of 1837 and 1893 are estimated to have required seven years to restore full employment—the same as the Obama recovery. The Panic of 1873 technically required only six years.

Therefore, Obama’s 2008-2015 jobs recovery, when measuring time to full employment after a crisis, places in a three-way tie for second slowest in American history alongside the 1837-1844 and 1893-1900 recoveries.

Economic historians generally consider full employment recoveries to have been achieved in two to three years after most other pre-1929 panics. For example the Depression of 1920-21, which James Grant has appropriately dubbed “America’s last governmentally unmedicated depression,” is considered the second-worst downturn of the 20th century. All economic indicators fell faster in its first two quarters than in either 1929 or 2008, wholesale prices fell by 36.8%, and hundreds of banks failed. 

President Warren Harding’s response was to do absolutely nothing aside from slash the federal budget by one-third. And yet from 1921 to 1923 the unemployment rate fell from a peak of 9% to 4.8% (Romer), full employment being achieved in just two years.

Keep in mind as well that in the modern era, unemployment has been measured using increasingly lax methods designed to understate the jobless rate by leaving out idle workers who have simply stopped filing claims and given up looking for work. By contrast pre-1929 unemployment rate estimates use positive statistics used to extrapolate numbers employed and considering all other labor force members as jobless. If both periods were measured using the same methodology, the Obama period would break out of its tie and claim second place for slowest recovery to full employment all to itself.


II. GDP

What about post-crisis GDP growth? Again, the government only began keeping records during the Great Depression, and again economists have worked for decades to estimate GDP levels going back to the nation’s founding. To properly correlate to Obama’s eight years in office we look here at GDP growth for the eight years following other post-crisis troughs after the Panics of 1797, 1819, 1837, 1873, 1893, 1907, 1920-21, 1990, and 2008. In every case GDP bottoms out in the year of the panic itself or at most the following year (1894, 1907, 2008). We only measure five years after the Panic of 1792 and four years after the Panic of 1857 because the former was followed by the Panic of 1797 and the latter was followed by the 1861 start of the Civil War.

We also include the post-1982 Volcker Recession which, although technically not a banking panic, did shake up the financial system, and also because the more recent 1982-1990 recovery during the Reagan era has been widely contrasted to the 2009-2017 Obama recovery. We exclude the Great Depression which is already acknowledged as the worst depression in American history and which we know places worse than the Obama era.

Based on the compiled GDP figures from the BLS after 1929 and Johnston/Williamston before 1929 (St. Johns University, University of Miami, Northwestern University) who gathered estimates from over a dozen economists including Nobel Laureate Simon Kuznets, Christina Romer, Robert Gordon, Charles Calomiris, et al. we calculate the following eight-year GDP growth rates in constant 2012 dollars:

1792-1797: $5.2B - $7.1B, + 36.5% (five years)
1797-1805: $7.1B - $10.1B, + 42.2%
1819-1827: $15.7B - $21.9B, + 39.5%
1837-1845: $33.3B - $44.4B, +33.3%
1857-1861: $82.6B - $94.8B, +14.8% (four years)
1873-1881: $156.9B - $244.8B, +56.0%
1894-1902: $345.4B - $531.1B, +53.8%
1908-1916: $558.7B - $734.8B, +31.5%
1921-1929: $762.3B - $1.11T, +45.6%
1933-1941: $817.8B - $1.57T, + 92.0%
1982-1990: $6.81T - $9.37T, +37.6%
1991-1999: $9.36T - $12.61T, +34.7%
2009-2017: $15.21T - $18.05T, +18.7%

After extrapolating these four, five, and eight year growth figures into average annualized GDP growth rates the final tally is:

1792-1797 GDP growth rate: +6.42%
1797-1805 GDP growth rate: +4.50%
1819-1827 GDP growth rate: +4.25%
1837-1845 GDP growth rate: +3.66%
1857-1861 GDP growth rate: +3.51%
1873-1881 GDP growth rate: +5.72%
1894-1902 GDP growth rate: +5.33%
1908-1916 GDP growth rate: +3.48%
1921-1929 GDP growth rate: +4.81%
1933-1941 GDP growth rate:  +8.49%
1982-1990 GDP growth rate: +4.07%
1991-1999 GDP growth rate: +3.79%
2009-2017 GDP growth rate: +2.17%

Therefore the Obama recovery produced the worst post-crisis GDP growth rate in American history, even worse than the Great Depression.

It’s the only recovery that doesn’t achieve annualized growth rates in the mid-3% range or higher, and it even falls dramatically below that standard at a lethargic 2.17%. In fact, the average GDP growth rate of the eleven pre-2008 expansions is 4.50% or more than double that of the 2009-2017 recovery's 2.17%.


III. APPLES AND ORANGES?

Some critics may argue that there are far too many differences between the 19th and early 21st centuries to compare GDP growth between the two. Aside from the fact that the Obama recovery also lagged far behind the very recent post-1982 and post-1991 recoveries, it is true that there are many differences in how government responded to crisis and depression in the pre-Great Depression era. Unfortunately they nearly all reflect even more poorly on the Obama administration.

The most glaring difference between the 19th and early 21st centuries is that before 1929 government countercyclical policies to “medicate” panics and depressions simply didn’t exist. Presidents and Congresses were virtually 100% laissez-faire in their approach when panics and depressions struck. The lack of policy instruments included, but was not limited to:


-No central bank to push down interest rates and engage in quantitative easing (exceptions: 1792 with Hamilton’s Bank of the United States and the 1920-21 Fed)

-No central bank policy to counteract deflation. In fact, pre-WWII crises typically produced rapid price deflation when banks failed or contracted credit.

-No deposit insurance to induce depositors to leave their money in the bank and minimize failures.

-The gold standard limited policymakers’ ability to reinflate the money supply, not that anyone in government had yet thought of reinflating the money supply until Irving Fisher’s work on debt deflation in the 1930’s.

-No Federal Reserve discount (emergency lending) window.

-No unemployment insurance.

-No bank bailouts (TARP).

-No $9 trillion in Keynesian deficit spending. In fact, the federal government typically slashed the budget in depressions to compensate for falling tax revenues.

-No federal stimulus spending packages.

-Federal spending only 3-5% of GDP (versus 21-23% today).

-No “Cash for Clunkers.”

-No green energy subsidies.

-No bailouts for major auto companies or other industrials.

-No FOMC open market purchases of trillions of dollars in lousy mortgage-backed securities.


According to Obama’s economic advisers such as Christina Romer, Austin Goolsbee, Jared Bernstein, and Larry Summers, Democratic congressional leaders like Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid, virtually all the major newspapers and their economic columnists like Paul Krugman and Matt O’Brien, and Obama himself, depressions/recessions in the pre-1929 era should have been worse—a lot worse—than the post-2008 recession. 

Without all the stimulative magic potions administered by the Obama White House and the Federal Reserve, not only should pre-1929 depressions have taken much longer to reach full employment, they should have produced vastly inferior GDP recoveries and quite frankly each been a Great Depression in and of themselves. Instead they all dramatically outperformed the Obama recovery.

In fact, the only worse recovery in American history was the Great Depression, a slump where the Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt White Houses applied even more federal stimulus than the Obama administration.

Interesting, the two longest post-crisis unemployment slumps and the two worst GDP recoveries in American history also happened to be the same two where government intervened the most to promote recovery. By contrast every one of the over dozen pre-1929 post-crisis depressions received absolutely no federal government “help” and the leave-it-alone policy produced vastly superior recoveries.

Coincidence?

Thursday, September 6, 2018

Ten Years After Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's Conservatorships

Click here to read the original Cautious Optimism Facebook post with comments

4 MIN READ - A Deep Fannie dive courtesy of the Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs and other Egghead Stuff.


It was ten years ago on September 6th that taxpayer-backed GSE’s Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—which owned or guaranteed over half of the $12 trillion U.S. residential mortgage market at the time—were taken into conservatorship by the U.S. Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency. The distressed financial positions and effective failures of the two housing giants served as a prelude to the major financial crisis that would climax in the month starting a little over one week later. 

Here are some statutes, briefing passages, and quotes from the years before Fannie and Freddie’s demise that have already nearly disappeared from the media, and academic/policy record.


1) "The Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation have an affirmative obligation to facilitate the financing of affordable housing for low- and moderate-income families in a manner consistent with their overall public purposes, while maintaining a strong financial condition and a reasonable economic return"

-Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Title XIII


2) "Low- and moderate-income goal. At least 50 percent of the dwelling units financed by each GSE’s mortgage purchases should be for families with incomes no greater than area median income (AMI), defined as median income for the metropolitan area or nonmetropolitan county. The corresponding goal was 42 percent for 1997-2000.”

“Special affordable goal. At least 20 percent of the dwelling units financed by each GSE’s mortgage purchases should be for very low-income families (those with incomes no greater than 60 percent of AMI) or for low-income families (those with incomes no greater than 80 percent of AMI) in low income areas. The corresponding goal was 14 percent for 1997-2000."

-2001 Department of Housing and Urban Development Issue Brief


3) “GSE Low-and-Moderate Income Housing Goals:

“Current [2004]: 50%
“2005: 52%
“2006: 53%
“2007: 55%
“2008: 56%”

-HUD Archives: News Release November 1, 2004


4) "Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will have to increase their funding of mortgages for low- and moderate-income home buyers, under a new rule the Department of Housing and Urban Development announced yesterday."

"To meet the new goals, Fannie and Freddie will need to buy over the next four years an estimated 400,000 more qualifying loans than the 10 million loans they otherwise would have bought."

-"HUD Sets New Goals for Fannie, Freddie," Washington Post, Nov 2, 2004


5) "In this report on Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) agreements, the National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) finds that $4.2 trillion dollars have been infused into minority and lower income neighborhoods since CRA passed in 1977.  Banks have committed to 430 CRA agreements, instituting multi-year programs covering loans, investments and banking services to communities in need. "

-National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) news release, Sep 19, 2005


6) "We will take CRA loans off your hands–we will buy them from your portfolios, or package them into securities–so you have fresh cash to make more CRA loans. Some people have assumed we don’t buy tough loans. Let me correct that misimpression right now. We want your CRA loans because they help us meet our housing goals.”

-Jamie Gorelick, Vice Chairman Fannie Mae, 2000 American Bankers Association conference speech


7) "Fannie Mae will buy CRA loans from lenders’ portfolios; we’ll package them into securities; we’ll purchase CRA mortgages at the point of origination; and we’ll create customized CRA-targeted securities. This expanded approach has improved liquidity in the secondary market for CRA product, and has helped our lenders leverage even more CRA lending."

-Jamie Gorelick, Vice Chairman Fannie Mae, public statement 2001


8.) "Countrywide's goal is to meet the Six Hundred Billion Dollar challenge, funding $600 billion in home loans to minorities and lower-income borrowers, and to borrowers in lower-income communities, between 2001 and 2010. As of July 31, 2004, the company had funded nearly $301 billion toward this goal."

"The result of these efforts is an enormous pipeline of mortgages to low- and moderate-income buyers. With this pipeline, Countrywide Securities Corporation (CSC) can potentially help you meet your Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) goals by offering both whole loan and mortgage-backed securities that are eligible for CRA credit."

-Countrywide website (now defunct) marketing CRA packaged securities to CRA-regulated banks as a vehicle to satisfy their CRA federal regulatory requirements.


9) "Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) in the secondary mortgage market, are the two largest sources of housing finance in the United States. They fund these mortgages by purchasing loans directly from primary market mortgage originators, such as mortgage bankers and depository institutions, and holding these loans in portfolio, or by acting as a conduit and issuing mortgage-backed securities (MBS), which are then sold in the capital markets to a wide variety of investors. HUD has estimated that 11.7 million dwelling units were financed by conventional conforming mortgages in 1998, and that the GSEs provided financing for 55 percent of these units."

-Introduction, 2001 Department of Housing and Urban Development Issue Brief


(some sources)





Saturday, September 1, 2018

Zambian Economist Dambisa Moyo: Does Africa Really Need More Government Aid, or More Capital Investment?

Click here to read the original Cautious Optimism Facebook post with comments

3 MIN READ - An offering from the Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs and other Egghead Stuff

“A friend of mine had a great quote: ‘Africa is to the development industry what Mars is to NASA.’ NASA spends billions on a MARS project, but they don’t really think we’re going there. Same with aid. Billions are spent, but no one really thinks it’s going to develop Africa.” 
            -Dambisa Moyo

As billions of people on the Asian continent rise from poverty in human history’s greatest economic emergence, Africa remains the world’s economic basketcase. The West’s unwavering prescription for the continent’s routine famines, epidemics, hyperinflations, and civil wars has been aid: well beyond a trillion dollars over the last seventy years to people who have largely lived on less than a dollar a day. 

Politicians, movie stars, and academics have forcefully appealed to public sympathy and governments to “give, give, give.” So-called Glamour-Aid musicians like Bob Geldof, Sting, and U2’s Bono started their own celebrity movement in the 1980’s with Band-Aid and U.S. and Canadian artists soon followed suit. Throwing more and more money at the problem seems to have no end.

But in this fascinating interview, Zambian-born Harvard and Oxford-educated economist Dambisa Moyo argues seventy years of atrocious results demands a new solution: the seventy-year old aid model should be scrapped and replaced with a focus towards capital markets and foreign investment. In fact, she says, aid—particularly large government-to-government aid transfers—is keeping Africa in a perpetual state of dependence and underdevelopment.

Read Moyo's Guernica interview at:

https://www.guernicamag.com/aiding_is_abetting/

Moyo’s 2009 conversation is getting a bit dated, but her message remains relevant and was keenly prescient too. Relevant because the West continues to hold Africa to a different standard from the rest of the developing world, and prescient because China is the only major power willing to invest in Africa’s development.

When China was clawing from the ruins of Maoist communism, when the Berlin Wall fell, and when today’s Asian Tigers were recovering from devastating wars or beginning as newly freed but poor former British colonies, Western politicians and musicians weren’t clamoring for an aid tsunami. Instead the West encouraged Eastern Europe and Asia to tap into global capital markets and accept foreign investment to develop their own markets and commerce.

And China is investing in Africa today while the West continues to flood the continent with aid. China does not place human rights contingencies on its contributions and it expects a return on its investment—just as Western firms expected to profit from their investments in Singapore, South Korea, or Eastern Europe—but it’s actually building factories, infrastructure, and offering jobs to unskilled African laborers that pay many times the prevailing domestic wage.

Moyo differentiates between private emergency aid, which she views as a humanitarian stopgap measure, and enormous aid transfers from western governments to corrupt African ones—most of which winds up in African politicians’ overseas bank accounts after they’ve paid their armies and allotted a few crumbs to their people. Unfortunately her critics—most of whom haven’t read her book or closely examined her message—attack her for allegedly trying to eliminate all emergency aid when in fact she goes out of her way to specifically target government-to-government transfers.

Since writing her book “Dead Aid,” Moyo has branched out, writing about worldwide competition for natural resources and the decline of the Western welfare state. She serves on the Board of Directors for Chevron, Barclays, and formerly Barrick Gold and Seagate. But criticizing the debilitating effects of aid addiction put her on the map and ruffled the feathers of celebrities and aid champions like Bill Gates and her former teacher Jeffrey Sachs.

Tuesday, August 7, 2018

Lessons from the Great Depression: Agriculture

Farm policy would serve as an impeccable exhibit of everything wrong with the price-floor policies of both the Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt administrations.

Click here to read the original Cautious Optimism Facebook post with comments


12 MIN READ - The Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs and other Egghead Stuff continues here with his fascinating and educational series on the lessons of the Great Depression.


Farmers slaughter their own animals before burning them

The corollary to Herbert Hoover’s belief that high wages were the cure for depression was that falling prices were a scourge that dampened wages, and that falling prices must therefore be countered with government action.

Hoover wasn’t completely incorrect: prices in America did fall precipitously during the early 1930’s due to a contracting money supply—abetted by bank failures and financial panics, a curtailment of lending by surviving banks, and after late 1931 an accelerated withdrawal of foreign gold from America’s monetary reserves—the fallout of the Bank of England’s first ever peacetime suspension of gold convertibility in September of the same year.


But Hoover’s solution, an attempt to artificially prop up prices as he did with his corporate “high wage” policy, only served to create unsold surpluses. The more effective method of price stabilization was monetary policy to restore the price level of the entire U.S. economy, but that onus lied with the Federal Reserve and was therefore mostly outside Hoover’s control.

Nonetheless Hoover drudged forward futilely, and his clumsy tool for raising farm prices was the newly formed Federal Farm Board. 


I. HOOVER AND THE FEDERAL FARM BOARD (FFB)


Hoover pressed Congress to pass the Agriculture Marketing Act establishing the FFB in June of 1929—before the October stock market crash. His intent was to offer loan support to farmers who had been left out of the Roaring Twenties as post-World War I demand for their crops tapered off.


Immediately the FFB was authorized to make $500 million ($108 billion in 2018 dollars when calculated as the same percentage of GDP) in low-interest loans to farmers over a 20-year period, and also to create farming cartels to push crop prices higher. The market crash in October quickly led to an acceleration of FFB policy action.

 On November 25, 1929 Hoover organized one of his many White House conferences, this time with major farm organizations and FFB administrators.


The topic of discussion: a proposal to accelerate loan and subsidy support, and to create cooperatives to hold crops off the market and effectively cartelize agriculture to keep farm prices high. Unsurprisingly, the farm organizations agreed wholeheartedly as they had been trying to form cartels for years, and now they had federal money and policy to assist them.

The FFB had already announced $150 million in loans (approx. 4.5% of the entire 1929 federal budget) shortly after the market crash to wheat coops to hold wheat off the market. The White House conference formalized federal coordination of the process with the ambitious aim of holding up prices.


At first the FFB’s efforts seemed to work. Prices were stabilized for a few months. But unsurprisingly, they quickly resumed their fall shortly afterwards. The cause? Seeing the initial success of the FFB’s attempts to support prices, farmers simply expanded their acreage, exacerbating the surplus problem. Furthermore, as the globe fell into depression wheat prices fell worldwide.


Seeing higher U.S. wheat prices maintained by the FFB, foreign wheat growers such as Argentina and Russia increased production (even as Joseph Stalin expropriated wheat from Ukrainian farmers in the Holodomor famine of 1932) placing further downward pressure on prices. As coop wheat stockpiles accumulated in warehouses across America, the FFB was forced to lend more and more to American farmers to keep wheat off the market.

Eventually the FFB shirked lending for wheat and began buying it directly to withhold, the official justification being that it would clear a profit when it sold its stocks later at inevitably higher prices.


But spurred on by expanding government purchases, wheat production continued to rise and prices continued to fall even as FFB coop warehouses reached the bursting point. The FFB was learning the first, hard lesson of running any cartel: simply trying to push up prices doesn’t work. The cartel must restrict output if it’s to achieve a sustainable rise in prices.

So the FFB began urging farmers to reduce their acreage voluntarily, with Secretary of Agriculture Arthur M. Hyde lecturing farmers on the evils of “overproduction” (never mind the overproduction was the result of government price-fixing and price floors to begin with). Northwest and Midwest farmers, unhappy with the prospect of reducing their acreage, were bullied by government-sponsored economists to switch from wheat to some other crop. 


Kansas Governor Clyde M. Reed wondered aloud publicly why the federal government on the one hand had encouraged increased farm production with price-floor policies while on the other hand it urged farmers to cut production.

In this capricious, on-again, off-again tragic comedy of contradictory policies the FFB’s Grain Stabilization Corporation cooperative had accumulated 65 million bushels of wheat to hold off the market by mid-1930. As prices continued to fall the GSC bought an astonishing 200 million more bushels by mid-1931. But all to no avail as the forces of worldwide supply-and-demand could not be so easily muted.


Finally, the FFB threw in the towel and dumped most of its wheat stocks overseas, sending wheat prices plunging to levels that Washington, DC had been spending profligately to avoid—likely even lower with such a large surplus unloaded at once. FFB losses totaled $300 million (including similar cotton coops) or 6.4% of the 1931 federal budget—a great deal of the money having been borrowed as Washington ran chronic budget deficits in its efforts to stimulate the economy to recovery. 

If measured as a percentage of the 1931 economy and translated into 2018 dollars, the FFB lost $88 billion on its coop schemes only to fail to prevent crop price declines. It donated 85 million bushels of wheat to the Red Cross.


In the end wheat prices settled where or near where they would have had the market been left alone, only that the federal government had borrowed and lost a small fortune in the process. 


To recoup these and other non-agricultural losses Herbert Hoover signed the Revenue Act of 1932 which raised taxes across the board including a top rate hike from 25% to 63%. The following year was the worst year of economic performance in American history with unemployment skyrocketing to over 25%.

The FFB attempted similar cartel operations to hold other crops off the market—all to no avail. It formed the Cotton Stabilization Corporation (CSC) to hold nearly five million bales in warehouse storage. But for the same reasons cotton prices continued to fall. FFB Chairman James C. Stone then urged the governors of cotton growing states to “immediately mobilize every interest and available agency… to induce immediate plowing under of every third row of cotton now growing.”


The New York Times, itself operating in a past era of journalistic sanity long since gone, condemned the edict calling it “one of the maddest things that ever came from an official body.” 

Nevertheless by July of 1932 the CSC had spent $127 million on cotton of which it lost $94 million (2% of the 1932 federal budget: $78 million donated to the Red Cross plus $16 million in additional losses).

The FFB formed the National Wool Marketing Cooperation (NWMC) with the same intent of holding wool off the market. The result was another failure to hold up prices and the NWMC lost $12.5 million of its $31.5 million in outlays.


The FFB created less ambitious cooperatives that focused more heavily on subsidies and loan assistance—with the “suggestion” that farmers reduce production. These include the National Livestock Marketing Association, multiple dairy and butter cooperatives, a National Bean Marketing Association, a National Pecan Marketing Association, and less organized aid to growers of citrus, figs, grapes and raisins, potatoes, apples, sugarbeets, honey, nuts, maple syrup, tobacco, poultry, eggs, and rice.


In the end the FFB burned through hundreds of millions of dollars, an enormous sum at the time, in a failed attempt to rescind the worldwide laws of supply and demand in what can only be described as a fiasco. By the nadir of the depression an epidemic of farm bankruptcies had spread across the country—the aftermath of the dust bowl drought, contraction of the export market resulting from the Smoot-Hawley initiated international trade war, the heavy debt burden of FFB loans, and the empty promise of higher crop prices to repay those loans. An estimated 25% of depression-era farm bankruptcies were due to inability to pay back FFB loans.


II. ROOSEVELT AND THE AAA


In the frenzy of the Roosevelt Administration’s “First 100 Days” Congress passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act granting new powers to the federal government to prop up crop prices. Now instead of subsidies, loan support, and voluntary exhortations to reduce acreage, the newly formed Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) not only authorized federal dollars to be spent directly to farmers to stop growing food, but according to economic historian Robert Higgs it also “provided for acreage and production controls, restrictive marketing agreements, and regulatory licensing of processors and dealers ‘to eliminate unfair practices and charges.’”


The AAA also “authorized new lending, taxed processors of agricultural commodities, and rewarded farmers who cut back production.” The expenses of the AAA were paid for by the “processing tax” levied on, ironically, agriculture itself (Sennholz, 1969).

Famously, the Roosevelt era has been characterized by stories of farmers plowing under their crops and slaughtering and burning livestock while Americans were going hungry. And as we now know the stories are absolutely true. 


The AAA paid farmers to soak oranges in kerosene to prevent consumption and burn corn as fuel (sound familiar?). In one of the many contradictory policy outcomes, farmers not only slaughtered livestock at the behest of the AAA, but also because feed prices had been deliberately pushed up to levels that generated losses for farmers who paid higher prices to feed pigs and cows.

On January 6, 1936 the Supreme Court ruled the AAA unconstitutional due primarily to its coerced cartelization and monopolization policies, but FDR continued with it anyway under the guise of a “soil conservation” program, paying farmers officially to “conserve soil” when in fact they were still being paid to plow under crops and slaughter livestock (DiLorenzo, 1998).


In the end, crop prices did rise and farm income with it, but this was due more to the reinflation of the money supply as a whole—the product of Federal Reserve policy, the enactment of the FDIC, and abandonment of the gold standard. U.S. prices rose nationwide by over 25% from 1932 to 1936 due to reinflation efforts alone, providing many farmers relief from debt payments denominated in more expensive dollars based on pre-1932 price levels.


And to FDR’s credit, his efforts to tear down Smoot-Hawley imposed trade barriers reopened overseas markets to U.S. agriculture, the policy instrument being the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 that empowered the White House to negotiate country-by-country bipartisan reductions or eliminations of tariffs.

Although the process of reestablishing unimpeded commerce with America’s important trading partners took nearly seven years (to the outbreak of WWII) the process slowly but steadily relieved pressure on farmers whose overseas markets had been choked off by early 1930’s protectionism.

III. ARTISTS AND PLAYWRIGHTS: NEVER RIGHT BUT ALWAYS SELF-ASSURED


During the early years of the Roosevelt Administration, the tragedy of deliberate food/crop destruction in the midst of widespread hunger didn’t go unnoticed.


Author John Steinbeck famously wrote of the plight of hungry and unemployed Americans watching hopelessly as crops were burned in “The Grapes of Wrath.” Steinbeck, while not a card-carrying member of the Communist Party, was a member of the communist League of American Writers, famously visited the Soviet Union, joined in solidarity with labor movements and striking workers, and was surveilled by the J. Edgar Hoover FBI.

Although he drifted towards the political center three decades later, his socialist-populist leanings were on full display during the Great Depression as he protested the plight of the poor against the dehumanizing marketplace (as if anything resembling the free market actually remained during the 1930's) in his Pulitzer Prize winning novel:
“The purple prunes soften and sweeten. My God, we can't pick them and dry and sulphur them. We can't pay wages, no matter what wages. And the purple prunes carpet the ground. And first the skins wrinkle a little and swarms of flies come to feast, and the valley is filled with the odor of sweet decay. The meat turns dark and the crop shrivels on the ground.
“And the pears grow yellow and soft. Five dollars a ton. Five dollars for forty fifty pound boxes; trees pruned and sprayed, orchards cultivated—pick the fruit, put it in boxes, load the trucks, deliver the fruit to the cannery—forty boxes for five dollars. We can't do it. And the yellow fruit falls heavily to the ground and splashes on the ground. The yellowjackets dig into the soft meat, and there is a smell of ferment and rot…”
 “...There is a crime here that goes beyond denunciation. There is a sorrow here that weeping cannot symbolize. There is a failure here that topples all our success. The fertile earth, the straight tree rows, the sturdy trunks, and the ripe fruit. And children dying of pellagra must die because a profit cannot be taken from an orange. And coroners must fill in the certificate—died of malnutrition—because the food must rot, must be forced to rot.”
 “The people come with nets to fish for potatoes in the river, and the guards hold them back; they come in rattling cars to get the dumped oranges, but the kerosene is sprayed. And they stand still and watch the potatoes float by, listen to the screaming pigs being killed in a ditch and covered with quick-lime, watch the mountains of oranges slop down to a putrefying ooze; and in the eyes of the people there is the failure; and in the eyes of the hungry there is a growing wrath. In the souls of the people the grapes of wrath are filling and growing heavy, growing heavy for the vintage.”
                 -The Grapes of Wrath

If only Steinbeck had taken a Microeconomics 101 course in his youth and learned the fundamentals of price floors and price ceilings. Maybe he would have better understood the true causes of hunger and human suffering during the depression (Herbert Hoover’s FFB and Franklin Roosevelt’s AAA policies), but then he wouldn't have a Pulitzer Prize for eloquently getting it so wrong.


Note: The Cautious Optimism Economics Correspondent drew heavily from Murray N. Rothbard’s classic book “America’s Great Depression” and recommends it highly—particularly “Part III: The Great Depression: 1929-1933.” The PDF version is available free online at the Ludwig von Mises Institute’s website mises.org.