A Political and Economic History of China, Part 30: The First Nationalist-Communist Civil War of 1927-1936, Part 2 of 2

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6 MIN READ - The Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs and Other Egghead Stuff's series on China history moves into the 1930's, this time recounting how very close Chiang Kai-shek came to annihilating the Chinese communists completely, but still failed.

By 1933 Chiang Kai-shek had attempted four “annihilation campaigns” against rural mountainous communist rebel strongholds in Jiangxi province, all of which failed in the face of unconventional CCP guerilla tactics.

Chiang was also simultaneously trying to hold off an increasingly aggressive Japanese army operating from Manchuria while trying to enlarge and modernize his armies for that eventual confrontation, all while attempting to reform China itself.

Against this historical backdrop 21st century CCP propaganda has slightly toned down its usual damnation of Chiang Kai-shek. Instead of the Mao and Deng-eras’ constant referrals to Chiang the “imperialist running dog” who “tried to divide the country”—an ironic accusation given that Chiang controlled most of China and it was the Communists’ efforts to overthrow his government that divided the country—the modern CCP portrayal of Chiang depicts him more as a leader who was simply overwhelmed by the circumstances: renegotiating treaties with western powers, maintaining control of China through alliances with untrustworthy warlords, restraining the Japanese in Manchuria, later resisting an all-out Japanese invasion of China, fighting the Communists, and attempting to reform the most populous country on earth after a century-plus of neglect by the corrupt Qing dynasty.

According to today’s CCP, Chiang Kai-shek was simply a man who wasn’t up to the task (but of course the Communists say they would have been).

The Correspondent also believes the CCP’s more conciliatory tone is the product of contemporary politics. Today the Taiwanese Nationalist Party (KMT), which still believes in the principle of One China and eventual reunification with the mainland, has been at odds with the independence-minded Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) which the CCP despises. Beijing has softened its tone a little about Chiang Kai-shek in hopes of gaining the Taiwanese KMTs favor, promoting a more disarming portrait of the CCP, and theoretically undermining the DPP’s political power.

Good luck with that.

Meanwhile, back to 1933.

THE FIFTH ANNIHILATION CAMPAIGN

After four failed “annihilation campaigns” Chiang Kai-shek began cooperating with German military advisors who recommended a change in strategy. With a new blueprint for battlefield victory Chiang believed he finally held the key to defeating the communist guerillas and prepared to launch a decisive fifth “annihilation campaign.” 

The fifth annihilation campaign strategy was indeed markedly different from the failed previous four.

Instead of large army groups attempting to locate and confront small and elusive communist guerillas, the Nationalist army would encircle a much larger territory known to enclose the bulk of the CCP’s forces. A blockade would then be established to prevent food and supplies from reaching the rebels.

From there Nationalist troops would tighten the noose, or “ring,” by advancing systematically and deliberately towards the center and building bases, fortifications, and barriers along the way to slowly squeeze the Communists until they could finally be “annihilated” by bombardment.

This new strategy required long-term planning and more patience than a simpler frontal assault, but it proved far more effective. The Communists found themselves slowly falling back on all sides, retreating into smaller and smaller sanctuaries, and by the fall of 1934 Chiang was preparing for their final destruction.

Fortunately for the Communists they had key spies working within Nationalist army headquarters who caught wind of Chiang’s endgame. These spies were able to access documents with the precise timeline of Chiang’s plans, down to the most minute details, and they meticulously recorded them in small booklets. The stolen intelligence was then handed to another spy named Xiang Yunian whose job it was to deliver it to the main communist stronghold inside the encirclement front lines.

Since anyone who attempted to cross over could be arrested or even killed by KMT troops, Xiang had to proceed carefully. He spent many days hiding out in the mountains dressed as a beggar in rags. To make his disguise more convincing he used a rock to knock out four of his front teeth, and he carried a sack of rotten food on his back with the valuable intelligence hidden at the bottom of the pile.

Through concealment and disguise Xiang successfully penetrated the Nationalist army “ring” and reached the communist base. Once alerted to the KMT’s final annihilation plans Mao Zedong quickly mobilized his troops for a breakout from the encirclement which began in October 1934.

At the very last minute, right before Chiang had finished building the last western fortifications, electrified barbed wire fences, and mobilizing his troops into position to repel an attempted escape, approximately 86,000 communist troops fled to the west beginning an epic 6,000 mile retreat known in CCP lore as “The Long March.”

THE LONG MARCH

The Long March reads like a patriotic saga in today’s PRC history books. During their long retreat communist forces were constantly pursued by Chiang Kai-shek’s armies. Marching deeper and deeper into western China the Communists endured small battles and skirmishes on a near-daily basis. In order to avoid a full frontal confrontation, CCP commanders were often forced to accept losses, sometimes sacrificing brigade or small division-sized units to buy time that allowed the main force to escape repeated KMT encirclement attempts.

The Communists retreated into Guangdong and Guangxi provinces, the latter marginally controlled by warlords who gave them a brief reprieve, then deeper into the rocky and mountainous regions of Guizhou and Yunnan provinces.

(Today Guizhou and Yunnan contain 18 of the world’s 25 highest bridges, spanning the two provinces’ many steep river gorges)

Along the way they suffered casualties not only at the hands of pursuing Nationalist troops, but also to disease, exposure on snowcapped mountain passes, or drowning in cold marshes and inland swamps.

The dwindling communist army turned north into even more barren and remote Gansu and Ningxia provinces. Eventually they found their way into the remote northern province of Shaanxi, again under marginal warlord control, where they linked up with 15,000 more communists who had gathered from all regions of northern China. 

Thus marked the end of the yearlong Long March, but losses to KMT attacks and the elements reduced the original force of 86,000 to about 8,000.

Even with their numbers greatly diminished, surviving the Long March elevated the CCP’s public image and strangely enough cemented Mao Zedong’s position as undisputed leader of the CCP. The Correspondent remembers years ago reading that Mao gave a victory speech from the CCP’s new base in Yan’an. To his few remaining troops he declared (paraphrasing) “Now only 8,000 of us remain, but those 8,000 have proven they are made of gold for having survived the Long March.”

If the Economics Correspondent were one of the survivors and witnessed Mao’s leadership losing over 90% of the army’s forces, he would think such a “victory speech” serves more to condemn Mao’s leadership instead of elevating him to top comrade status.

However Mao was known as a gifted orator who could sway crowds with the flowery poetry of his speeches, and the Long March was an epic feat for those who survived it. So who’s to judge why the handful of remaining communists welcomed him as beloved leader of the now dilapidated Chinese Red Army.

EDGAR SNOW

Providing another boost to the CCP’s image, this time to overseas readers, was American journalist and communist sympathizer Edgar Snow who gave a series of interviews in Shaanxi. 

Mao arranged a large party of soldiers to greet Snow upon his arrival, cheering slogans of praise for the American which he admitted later in life had an emotional effect on him. Over the next several days Snow interviewed Mao and, at the end, was asked by communist officials to revise his notes and portray Mao in the most flattering light possible (to which Snow did not object).

In 1937 Snow published the book "Red Star Over China" which introduced Mao to the world, portraying him as a sincere communist who cared deeply for the working classes and a crusader against world fascism who was committed to resisting Japanese encroachment on China.

Once the book was translated into Chinese it also helped raise domestic opinion of Mao, elevating him to something of a hero for his “struggle” against the Japanese. 

Over the preceding years Chiang Kai-shek had continued a policy of Japanese appeasement while the Communists had loudly promoted messages of patriotic resistance. The contrast gained the Communists more and more Chinese support, but in reality they launched extremely limited and wholly symbolic operations against only the periphery of Japanese-occupied territory, mostly between Shaanxi and Manchuria. Nevertheless the guerilla attacks, while militarily negligible, provided immeasurable propaganda value.

Most Chinese had become frustrated with Chiang’s reluctance to take the Japanese head-on in Manchuria and questioned why he was more concerned with warring on fellow Chinese. But Mao’s small-scale operations against Japanese forces, combined with the Chinese translation of Edgar Snow’s book, served to boost domestic public opinion of the Communists. 

Chiang was losing the public relations battle.

We’ll continue with the end of the first Nationalist-Communist civil war in the next article.