A Political and Economic History of China, Part 25: The Republican Era of 1912-1928, Part 1—Domestic Power Struggles

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6 MIN READ - With the 2024 campaign and election over, the Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs and Other Egghead Stuff restarts his history of China series, picking up with the chaos that ensued after the fall of the last imperial dynasty in 1911.

Attached picture: Rough outline of regional Chinese warlord control in 1925. Blue areas are controlled by Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary Nationalist (Guomindang or GMD) party.

In July we left off with the tireless efforts of Chinese revolutionary Sun Yat-sen whose work played a role in the collapse of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911).

The Qing’s disintegration was sudden and unexpected. Sun was himself in Denver, Colorado raising money when it happened and quickly returned to China to formulate a new, more modern government to fill the power vacuum that had so abruptly appeared.

Despite his revered place in history today, it’s important to understand that in 1911 Sun was only one of many players working to topple the Qing, an alien dynasty of outsiders that had fallen out of favor with its ethnic Chinese subjects. Upon Sun’s return to China he was still not very well known. Among the candidates to lead a new China Sun was viewed as lacking the strongman character needed to rule a provisional government during such a precarious time.

After deliberation among revolutionary leaders a fairly obvious choice was made to assume that role, at least temporarily: General Yuan Shikai. 

Sun assented to Yuan's presidency for the same reasons.

YUAN SHIKAI

Yuan Shikai is a shady figure in Chinese history and likewise loathed in modern China. Dubbed the “traitor general” for:

1) Betraying the young emperor Guangxu’s plans to reform China in 1898 by ratting him out to his aunt, the powerful empress dowager Cixi. Cixi then arrested Guangxu and later had him poisoned, and

2) Betraying the anti-Qing Xinhai revolution, something we’re about to get to.

A little background on Yuan.

During the great Taiping rebellion of 1851-1864 the scholar-general Zeng Guofan commanded Qing forces so skillfully that he was awarded control over most of the postwar imperial army. Zeng’s protégé, Li Hongzhang, assumed that role shortly after when the aging Zeng, who had been brought out of semi-retirement during the civil war, called it quits.

Over the next four decades the Qing weakened and Beijing increasingly lost its ability to govern the country. Subsequently regional military governors, generals previously appointed by Zeng and Li, took greater control of their provinces. By the time of the Qing’s collapse Li’s protégé, the aforementioned Yuan Shikai, was now general of the most powerful armies based in Beijing and it was only he who could keep the semi-autonomous provincial generals (later dubbed “warlords”) in line.

So in 1912 most anti-Qing revolutionary leaders viewed Yuan as the only man strong enough to prevent China from breaking up into military fiefdoms and he easily won appointment as provisional president by vote of the new provisional senate.

In theory China would become a republic with a democratically elected parliament and president sharing power. The Nationalist Party, or KMT (known as the “Guomindang” in mandarin) held the most seats in parliament with Sun Yat-sen as party leader.

However before long it became clear Yuan was interested in neither democratic government nor power sharing. He attempted to dissolve the republican house of representatives and senate, leading to clashes with the Nationalists and other democratic reform-minded parties. In response Yuan consolidated his power by granting even more autonomous powers to his regional military allies in return for support.

In 1915 Yuan made it official by arranging a puppet council vote to “offer” him the emperorship of China which he “accepted” as head of a new dynasty. He quickly ordered jade seals and imperial robes for himself.

It seemed after all the hard work and sacrifice to rid China of the Qing dynasty the imperial monarchy had returned.

But the political backlash against Yuan’s new dynasty was so great that even many of his warlord allies protested. A few provinces outright rebelled.

Surprised by the opposition Yuan delayed his coronation ceremony over and over again, attempting to appease his detractors enough to eventually carry through with his ascension, but after just 83 days officially as emperor he “abdicated” and restored the republic—in part due to growing revolts but also because his own health was failing. 

Yuan died just three months later of uremia.

China had dodged a restoration of the dynastic system, but Yuan’s death would leave behind an even larger power vacuum than the one he had filled. Now there was no obvious choice to control the warlords and China began its descent into regional and provincial chaos.

Once again, in theory a democratically elected republican government in Beijing—composed of a parliament and president—would run China. But in practice the republican government had no effective power to control the autonomous warlords and their personal armies.

Further complicating matters was internal bickering among republican politicians and a few political assassinations. Without clear direction no elected president held power long enough to challenge the warlords let alone build a new China, and the Beijing government often became a puppet of the strongest militarist warlord cliques. By one count after Yuan’s death Republican China had fourteen presidents from 1916 to 1928, the year Chiang Kai-shek officially became president and held power until the communist civil war victory in 1949.

WARLORDS

Hence the 1916-1928 period is famously known as the “warlord era.” Multiple generals enjoyed regional authority over counties, provinces, and in some cases multiple provinces. Most craved expansion of their fiefdoms, some signed fragile alliances with one another, and others went to war.

The one constant under all warlords was general suffering of the common people. Warlords raised funds for their mini-empires by imposing direct taxation—often precocious and excessive—on the peasants. To the common Chinese villager it seemed that things hadn’t changed much from the Qing dynasty. Instead of corrupt regional Qing officials it was now regional warlords who squeezed them.

The many warlords also made for a colorful cast of characters, some whose nicknames found their way into the western press. For example there was Zhang Xun, known as the “Pigtail General” for his Qing loyalties. Zhang wished to restore the Qing monarchy and ordered his troops to retain their queues.

Then there was the “Christian General” Feng Yuxian, who converted his troops to Christianity and baptized them with a fire hose.

One of the worst warlords was Zhang Zongchang, dubbed the “Dogmeat General” because of his taste for a Chinese tonic named “dogmeat” and penchant for playing the Chinese gambling game known as “eating dogmeat.” Time Magazine called Zhang Zongchang “the basest warlord” for his brutality, eccentric personality, and lavish lifestyle—financed by the peasants he crushed under repressive taxation.

Given that the warlords enjoyed de facto control over their regions, business interests—both domestic and foreign—were forced to deal with them which usually meant paying regular bribes to retain their investments and run their operations.

The most consequential warlord-foreign investment relationship was between Japan and perhaps the most famous and powerful of all the warlords: Zhang Zuolin, who enjoyed control over all three provinces of Manchuria while engaging in power-sharing agreements with Beijing.

During the 1920’s Japan made significant investments in Manchuria, the offshoot of expelling Russia during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. Zhang's army received financial backing from the Japanese in exchange for allowing the construction of Japanese railroads and factories.

Japan, which history now records had its eye all along on the outright conquest of Manchuria, felt Zhang was too formidable an obstacle to their plans and arranged his assassination by exploding a bomb under his railcar the evening of June 4, 1928. From there the Japanese attempted to install his more malleable, opium-addicted son Zhang Xueliang to replace him. However, the Japanese were soon surprised at the son’s resolve when he shook off his opium habit, assumed his father’s place with authority, and put up a great deal more resistance than they had anticipated.

A decade later Zhang Xueliang, serving as a general in Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist army, would kidnap his own boss in an incident with huge implications for China’s future, a subject we’ll get to during World War II.

In the next installment on the Republican Era we’ll look at foreign interference during China’s early road to modernization.