WaPo/Great Depression "expert" predict Trump's tax cuts will create another Great Depression... in 2017

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Now that the Big Beautiful Bill has passed and made the Trump 2017 tax cuts permanent, the Cautious Optimism Economics Correspondent wonders if anyone has seen this WP headline?

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/11/30/im-a-depression-historian-the-gop-tax-bill-is-straight-out-of-1929/

No, that’s not from this week. It’s from 2017.

Nearly eight years later and I’m still waiting for the next Great Depression the 2017 tax cuts were supposed to spawn.

From the author:

” In 1926, Calvin Coolidge’s treasury secretary, Andrew Mellon, one of the world’s richest men, pushed through a massive tax cut that would substantially contribute to the causes of the Great Depression.”

The author, a “Great Depression historian,” fails to mention Herbert Hoover’s giant tax hike in 1932—when the top income tax rose from 25% to 63% and all other income levels saw at least a doubling of their tax rate—that plunged the economy into Great Depression. The year after the tax increase was the worst year in U.S. economic history with the unemployment rate reaching 25.9%.

The Economics Correspondent has a copy of Robert McElvaine’s book “The Great Depression” and it’s hundreds of pages of “the free market doesn’t work” and “massive state intervention, mostly government spending, promotes economic recovery and prosperity.”

Left Coast Correspondent: No, the CIA didn't overthrow a democratically elected Iranian government in 1953

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7 MIN READ – With Iran back in the really, really big headlines the Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Left Coast Affairs and Other Inexplicable Phenomena dismantles the eternal myth that “America created today's Islamic regime problem back when the CIA overthrew the democratically elected president of Iran in 1953.”

PM Mossadegh and the Shah

The Left Coast Correspondent hat tips foreign policy writer Tim Starr for forwarding an excellent Peter Theroux article on Iran’s “coup that never was.”

The Correspondent recommends Theroux’s column highly, but it’s a long 20 minute read here:

https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/israel-middle-east/articles/cia-coup-in-iran-that-never-was-mossadegh

So for those with less time, here’s:

1) A brief synopsis that only takes one minute, and...

2) For those willing to continue for another couple of minutes an interesting confirmation of Theroux’s thesis using Google Gemini AI, but only if you know the right questions to ask.

One minute synopsis: 

According to Theroux’s column, then-Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh:

1) Was not democratically elected by the people, but rather appointed by the Shah and confirmed by the Iranian parliament, much how Supreme Court justices and Attorneys General are nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate.

(Theroux points out that Americans never refer to “the democratically elected Justice Brett Kavanaugh” or “the democratically elected Merrick Garland,” but we’ve been told for decades about “the democratically elected Mohammed Mossadegh”)

2) Was far from democratic himself. He dissolved Iran’s supreme court and then, having alienated every political constituency with his radical and authoritarian policies except the communist Tudeh party, he dissolved parliament using an unconstitutional, disputed, non-secret ballot election where he officially received more than 99 percent of the vote granting him autocratic powers.

3) Was not overthrown in a coup, but rather dismissed by the Shah of Iran who had the constitutional authority and had previously used it over a dozen times prior.

4) The CIA did not carry out the alleged coup, although it did urge the young and uncertain Shah to stand up to his increasingly autocratic prime minister. Rather, it was the Shah and the Iranian military who legally removed Mossadegh from power, and if anyone can be accused of attempting a coup it was Mossadegh himself. 

The extent of the CIA's involvement was financial support for pro-Shah protesters to counter Soviet-backed Tudeh communist party protestors who had regularly attacked Mossadegh's opponents and journalists.

5) Members of the present-day Iranian opposition roll their eyes every time they hear a progressive westerner sanctimoniously declare that “the CIA overthrew the democratically elected government of Iran” and consider such westerners useful tools parroting the Islamic regime’s venerable propaganda.

That's the end of the 1 minute synopsis.
__________

For those willing to read on, the Left Coast Correspondent confirms Theroux’s allegations using Google AI but has learned it’s very important how you word the questions if you want to get to the truth.

For example, when asking Google Gemini AI using the straightforward media version:

Q1. “Was the democratically elected prime minister of Iran overthrown in a 1953 coup?”

The answer is:

A1. “Yes, the democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammad Mosaddegh, was overthrown in a 1953 coup orchestrated by the United Kingdom and the United States. This coup, known as the 1953 Iranian coup d'état, aimed to oust Mosaddegh and reinstate the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The coup was driven by the desire to regain control of Iran's oil resources, which Mosaddegh had nationalized.”

But if one knows to ask more deliberate and pointed questions, the less widely reported truth emerges:

Q2. “Was Mohammed Mossadegh elected by popular vote?”

Gives us…

A2. “No, Mohammad Mossadegh was not directly elected by popular vote as Prime Minister of Iran. He was appointed by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1951, based on the authority granted to the Shah by the Iranian Constitution at the time. While his appointment was confirmed by the Iranian parliament (Majlis), this was an endorsement by representatives, not a direct national election by the people.”

More examples of the truth being a bit more complicated than the accepted narrative, once again provided you know how to ask the questions, include:

Q3. “Did the Shah of Iran have the constitutional authority to dismiss the prime minister?”

A3. “Yes, according to the 1906 Iranian constitution, the Shah had the constitutional authority to appoint and dismiss prime ministers. The Constitution outlined that the Ministers were appointed and dismissed by the decree of the King. While the Majlis (parliament) also had the power to dismiss ministers, one source suggests that there were differing interpretations, with some believing that the Majlis alone held the power to elect or terminate the Prime Minister. However, other sources emphasize the Shah's authority in this regard, stating that the Prime Minister served ‘at the pleasure of the monarch.’”

Q4. “Did the Shah of Iran dismiss other prime ministers before Mohammed Mossadegh?”

A4. “Yes, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, had dismissed other prime ministers before Mohammad Mossadegh. In fact, sources indicate that there had been 14 recess appointments or dismissals of prime ministers prior to Mossadegh's dismissal. This suggests that the Shah's ability and willingness to change prime ministers was already established before his tenure with Mossadegh. Mossadegh himself was aware of this historical pattern.”

Q5. “Did Mohammad Mossadegh dissolve parliament in a disputed referendum?”

A5. “Yes, Mohammad Mossadegh did dissolve the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) following a disputed referendum in 1953. The referendum, held in August 1953, resulted in over 99% of voters supporting the dissolution. However, this referendum and its legitimacy were questioned.”

Q6. “Did the Iranian constitution allow popular referendums to dissolve parliament in 1953?”

A6. “No, the Iranian constitution in 1953 did not allow for popular referendums to dissolve the parliament (Majlis). 

"Here's why:

”Shah's Constitutional Right: The constitution at that time granted the Shah (Mohammad Reza Pahlavi) the sole constitutional right to dissolve the Majlis.

”Mossadegh's Referendum: Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh held a referendum in August 1953 on the dissolution of parliament.

”Referendum's Illegality: This action by Mosaddegh was considered illegal under the constitution as it usurped the Shah's constitutional authority.

”Controversial Nature: The referendum itself was also criticized for its non-secret balloting process and the lack of opportunity for opponents to cast their votes easily.”

Q7. “Did Mohammad Mossadegh dissolve the Iranian Supreme Court?”

A7. “Yes, Mohammad Mossadegh, as Prime Minister of Iran, did order the dissolution of the Supreme Court in November 1952. According to a New York Times article from November 17, 1952, he ordered the court dissolved within five days. This action was taken amidst political tension and Mossadegh's increasing consolidation of power. Wikipedia notes that Mossadegh had already begun relying on emergency powers to rule, and his move to dissolve the court further fueled accusations of his becoming dictatorial.”

Correspondent’s side note: If Donald Trump dissolved the Supreme Court and dissolved Congress and was subsequently removed from office, can anyone picture progressive western intellectuals and journalists complaining for 70 years about “the coup that overthrew America’s democratically elected president?” 

It would be 70 years of Mardi Gras in the network news studios.

Q8. “Was the Iranian Tudeh party backed by the Soviet Union?”

A8. “Yes, the Iranian Tudeh Party was heavily influenced by and heavily reliant on the Soviet Union. It was effectively a pro-Soviet communist party in Iran. The Soviets played a significant role in its formation and subsequent activities, with the party often acting in accordance with Soviet interests, even at times at the expense of Iranian independence.”

Q9. “Did the Iranian Tudeh attack opposition and the press?”

A9. “Yes, the Iranian Tudeh Party has engaged in actions that have been described as attacks on opposition and the press at various points in its history… … During this period, the Tudeh Party formed an "unofficial alliance of convenience" with Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. While Mosaddegh did not officially endorse them, the Tudeh Party acted as "foot soldiers" for his government and engaged in violent attacks against opponents under the guise of supporting him, which contributed to Mosaddegh's declining reputation.”

Q10. “Did the Shah of Iran dismiss Mohammed Mossadegh with the help of the Iranian military?”

A10. “Yes, the 1953 Iranian coup, also known as Operation Ajax, involved the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and relied on the Iranian military, along with support from the United States and the United Kingdom. The coup aimed to remove Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh from power.

"Here's a more detailed breakdown:

“Initial Coup Attempt: The coup was initiated on August 15, 1953, with the goal of dismissing Mossadegh. The Shah, initially hesitant, fled to Italy when the first attempt failed.”

”Second Attempt: A second, successful attempt on August 19 led to Mossadegh's removal and the appointment of Fazlollah Zahedi as the new Prime Minister.

”Military Involvement: The Iranian military played a crucial role in the coup, supporting the Shah's actions and ultimately leading to Mossadegh's downfall.

“International Support: The United States and the United Kingdom also provided significant support to the coup, including financial assistance and propaganda efforts according to Wikipedia.”

Correspondent’s comment: It appears the truth really is out there in AI search engines provided you know the key details to ask about in advance.

Enjoy the article.

A Political and Economic History of China Addendum: Critics of the Atomic Bomb, Part 4 of 4

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Photo: Things have changed quite a bit since 1945.

7 MIN READ - The Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs submits his final installment critiquing critics of the atomic bomb and finishes the discussion with the question of using nuclear weapons today.

So far we’ve countered some of the most popular criticisms of America’s use of the atomic bomb in 1945: that the Japanese “were just about to surrender,” that a conventional invasion of Japan wouldn’t have cost many lives, or that a blockade of Japan would have produced a quick surrender with very little loss of life.

All of these are demonstrably false, and today we address the last of the popular cases that the atomic bomb was unnecessary:

4) “Several Allied policymakers and generals were opposed to using the bomb and said it wasn't needed.”

Although this reasoning is just an argument from authority, it’s true that when news of Hiroshima’s destruction broke several high profile military officers publicly voiced their opposition. A common example comes from conservative commentator Candace Owens who posted a quote of Dwight Eisenhower stating “It wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing."

(Owens’ post of Eisenhower’s quote also encouraged critical thinking and debate in about as civil and respectful a note as I’ve seen in a long time)

Eisenhower did write in his memoirs that when the bomb was dropped he had opposed its use. General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral William “Bull” Halsey also disagreed with the use of the bomb. So did Army Air Force generals Hap Arnold and Curtis LeMay, the latter of whom had been firebombing Japanese cities for months, killing hundreds of thousands of civilians.

On the surface it appears the military brass knew something the rest of the world didn’t and roundly opposed using the bomb.

But looking a little deeper there’s at least two problems with this line of reasoning.

First: the modern-day critics of the atomic bomb never mention the names of other generals and policymakers who supported its use.

Among those in the “for” camp were:

Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, who outranked every military officer mentioned in the “against” camp.

His boss, Secretary of War Henry Stimson.

Admiral Chester Nimitz was publicly silent on the bomb, but during invasion planning—when faced with the prospect of confronting 735,000 IJA soldiers in Kyushu and countless kamikaze strikes against his invasion fleet—he was enthusiastic about its use. Even after Nagasaki, Nimitz privately supported dropping a third atomic bomb if Japan refused to surrender.

World leaders like Winston Churchill supported the use of the bomb. But much more notably so did Chinese president Chiang Kai-shek whose fellow citizens, unlike Americans, were being killed by the IJA at a rate of roughly 100,000 a month until the bomb was dropped.

During his lengthy tenure Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew stated many times that as a young man in 1945 he supported the use of the atomic bomb as did most Singaporeans because it immediately stopped the death and suffering of occupied peoples at the hands of the IJA and secret police. The people of Vietnam and Indonesia, 3.5 to 4.5 million of whom died in the 1944-45 wartime famine, probably agreed too.

There's a second problem: Critics quote the names of many flag officers who were opposed only at the moment the bomb was dropped, but never follow up years later when the same men changed their minds.

At least three of the military names thrown around from the “against” camp later about-faced. Why? Because in August of 1945 most of the world outside Japan hadn’t yet learned the full potential for military and civilian bloodshed in a conventional invasion or blockade.

Operation Olympic planners saw intelligence reports of IJA strengths in Kyushu, but not everyone else did. Only after Japan’s surrender did the world learn the entire Japanese adult civilian population was mobilized to fight to the death in the “Glorious Death of One Hundred Million” campaign.

Only later did the world learn how far away the Tokyo government was from accepting an actual surrender, until two atomic bombs were dropped and the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria, Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands.

And only after Japan’s surrender did the world learn the staggering rate at which civilian populations were dying—half a million every month at least—in Japanese occupied China, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Burma, and Indonesia.

Years after Japan’s surrender General Curtis LeMay changed his mind and publicly supported the use of the bomb. In an interview General Omar Bradley stated the Allies would have lost a staggering number of men in a conventional invasion, the Japanese even moreso, and that the atomic bomb saved countless lives.

General Douglas MacArthur's attitude towards the use of the atomic bomb changed markedly only a few years later when he publicly and repeatedly called for its use against Communist China to end the Korean War.

So the argument that “General X and Y understood the war better than you and they were against the atomic bomb, therefore you should be too” is weak. Because it cherry picks only the names that agree with the critics while ignoring all the other military and political leaders who didn’t—many of whose own citizens were dying en masse at the hands of the Japanese. 

And the argument also counts opponents of the bomb only at a narrow, specific point in time when they were initially “against” its use, but ignores some of those same officers who, once cognizant of just how bloody a conventional invasion or blockade would have turned out, shifted later in life and supported the bomb’s use.

A FINAL WORD ABOUT TODAY

Lastly, the Economics Correspondent would like to offer an opinion on what all this means today by posing a simple question:

Q. If faced with the same circumstances in Japan in 2025, would the United States use the atomic bomb again?

The Correspondent can confidently answer “No, the USA would not use nuclear weapons again” and, despite all his criticism of the World War II bomb’s critics, the Correspondent would agree wholeheartedly with a “no first use” policy.

Most of the modern-day nuclear powers are guided by the same thinking. Even if facing millions of deaths to conduct an invasion or a blockade, the Economics Correspondent believes the United States, the UK, France, India, and probably Russia and China would all resist the temptation to wrap a conflict up quickly with a nuclear first strike.

In fact we’re seeing a fitting case right now with Vladimir Putin opting not to solve the conflict against a non-nuclear Ukraine with his nuclear arsenal.

Why the change of attitude?

The world of nuclear weapons has not only changed dramatically since 1945, but as early as the 1950’s the circumstances already bore no resemblance to 1945. Within a few short years of Hiroshima tens of thousands of nuclear weapons had been constructed, and newly developed thermonuclear (hydrogen/fusion) weapons possessed over 1,000 times the destructive power of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks.

For reference: the “Fat Man” and “Little Boy” fission devices that were dropped on Japan yielded about 15 kilotons of destructive power. By 1954 the U.S. “Castle Bravo” hydrogen bomb test yielded 15 megatons (one megaton = 1,000 kilotons) and in 1961 the USSR tested the “Tsar Bomba” with a yield of 50 megatons, more than 3,000 times more powerful than Hiroshima.

In August 1945 only two atomic devices existed on earth and had to be delivered by slow, vulnerable propeller bomber aircraft. By the 1960’s there were 40,000 far more powerful nuclear warheads that could be delivered by intercontinental ballistic missile or submarine launched ballistic missile, both virtually indefensible at the time.

In other words the world quickly changed from one or two relatively small, novel weapons to the very real possibility of human civilization’s destruction in a matter of minutes.

For that reason most of the nuclear powers have been far more pensive about the implications of using nuclear weapons. In a world where unleashing a single nuke can trigger thousands of atomic reprisals within an hour and literally destroy civilization, it’s no wonder the major nuclear powers have adopted a “we will posses, but not use first” doctrine. To use nukes first would also give more irresponsible players like terrorist groups a rhetorical excuse to justify their own first use, i.e. “We could end the war on terror with the West quickly and save lives if we just take out a major city. After all [fill in nuclear power here] is already doing it.” 

Incidentally North Korea and Pakistan have not announced a “no first use” policy because they’re at odds with more conventionally powerful neighbors who they wish to deter from attack, but even the Kim dynasty has been extremely careful not to start even a small military conflict for fear it could escalate into a nuclear exchange.

Interestingly, the USA has not declared a “no first use” policy in favor of “strategic ambiguity” to keep anyone considering the use of chemical or biological weapons against population centers guessing, although for what little it’s worth the Correspondent will bet that the undisclosed policy really is “no first use.” 

But note that none of these players, whether democratic and authoritarian, ostensibly intelligent… or stoic, or senile, or blowhard… or crazy, has managed to start a war with another nuclear power. When it comes to the prospect of pressing the nuclear button and staring down the abyss, all of them have acted very rationally (except Iran... potentially).

In conclusion, it’s easy today to see the potential for worldwide destruction if the nuclear Pandora’s Box is opened by a first strike. Because we’ve had the luxury of being familiar for decades with the real potential for nuclear doomsday… knowledge that Allied war planners and their crystal ball didn’t have in August of 1945.

Therefore it’s a logical fallacy to judge Harry Truman by the standards of 2025, or even of 1955. Given what they knew at the time, the use of the bomb was justified. But first-use of nuclear weapons can’t be justified today, the major nuclear powers all know it, and so far eighty years removed from Hiroshima they’ve all abided by it.

A Political and Economic History of China Addendum: Critics of the Atomic Bomb, Part 3 of 4

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Photo: Millions dead and more dying from famine in Vietnam and Indonesia, c. August 1945.

6 MIN READ - The Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs moves on with the deadliest of all alternatives to secure Japan’s surrender in 1945, which ironically critics of the atomic bomb considered the most merciful: naval blockade.

In the last two columns we dispelled myths cited by critics of the atomic bomb that:

1) “Japan was just about to surrender,” and

2) “A conventional invasion and occupation of Japan would have cost fewer lives.”

In this third installment we address what’s probably the most mathematically backwards claim of all made by critics of the atomic bomb:

3) “The use of the atomic bomb created needless death since a naval blockade of Japan would have ended the war in at most a year without bloodshed.”

This is a fantastic myth that alleges there was a painless, casualty-free way to make Japan accept surrender without an invasion or use of the atomic bomb.

The contention is that the U.S. Navy, which the bomb’s critics correctly note enjoyed virtual supremacy on the seas by mid-1945, had already choked oil and food imports from the Japanese home islands. A blockade, they say, would have starved Japan enough that after at most one year the imperial government would have succumbed to economic pressure and surrendered.

There are several reasons this is one of the more absurd claims of bomb critics.

By this point the most obvious problem should be self-evident: the Japanese war cabinet had already demonstrated it didn’t care about the deaths of Japanese civilians. 

We know the “Big Six” cabinet members were willing to sacrifice millions of their own people in a face-saving national martyrdom campaign against conventional Allied invasion. The mobilization of all able-bodied Japanese men, women, and students was named “The Glorious Hundred Million Deaths” campaign.

We know even after hundreds of thousands of Japanese died in the massive 1945 U.S. firebombing campaigns that the war cabinet was unmoved and didn’t consider anything resembling surrender.

We know that after Hiroshima the war cabinet rejected an internal proposal for surrender that wasn’t even really a surrender: allowing the military government to remain in place, keep its conquered territories, prohibit any war crimes trials or any Allied soldiers on Japanese soil, and refusing to allow the Allies to disarm the Japanese military.

In reality a blockade would have lasted several years and hundreds of thousands, more likely millions, of Japanese civilians would have slowly starved to death while the cabinet fretted inside the imperial palace about saving face.

The Japanese government would also have plenty of time to film propaganda footage of civilians reduced to skeletons, curled up in the streets while slowly dying from starvation—a far worse death than vaporizing under an atomic explosion—and today the same critics of the atomic bombings would be accusing Harry Truman of war crimes for “slowly murdering millions of Japanese civilians by famine when the atomic bomb could have ended the war instantly with minimal loss of life.”

The second reason the “blockade is better” argument is horrible is because it would have been the most deadly option globally.

While the allies waited years for a blockade to pressure the imperial government into surrendering, not only would hundreds of thousands or possibly millions of Japanese civilians starve to death, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) would continue killing even larger numbers of civilians in its occupied territories.

Years ago the Economics Correspondent’s back-of-the-napkin research yielded a 1945 estimate that over 100,000 people were dying each month at the hands of occupying Japanese forces, mostly in China. Waiting only a year for a blockade to work would have therefore resulted in about 1.2 million more dead outside of Japan versus ending the war quickly with 150,000 killed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

However, Pacific War historian Jon Parshall has conducted a much more thorough review of Japanese occupied territories in 1945, one that includes other factors the Correspondent missed.

First, by mid-1945 there were already famines raging in Japanese occupied Vietnam and Indonesia. Even if the Allied nations tried to deliver food relief it would have been impossible given the disruptive IJA land presence. 

Japan’s sudden surrender stopped the famines, but not after 1-2 million had already starved to death in Vietnam and 2.5 million more in Indonesia.

Obviously waiting out a blockade would have permitted the famines to continue, killing millions more innocent people.

Also, during a blockade not only would Japanese civilians have starved, but the Allies would have continued their bombing and firebombing campaigns to pressure the Japanese government into giving in.

Parshall crunches the math in multiple war-ending scenarios starting with a baseline of the atomic bombings themselves. 

Atomic bomb: All-in-all, more than 150,000 Japanese died in Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, from both the initial explosions and lingering radiation effects including cancer. Then the war ended.

Blockade: The numbers balloon appallingly. Several hundred thousand more civilians would continue to die every month in the previously mentioned famines that were already raging in Vietnam and Indonesia.

Chinese civilians and a smaller number of soldiers would also continue dying at a rapid rate each month, plus smaller numbers in Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, parts of Burma, and extreme northern Philippines.

In total, adding Japanese, Allied, and neutral country deaths, Parshall calculates that somewhere between 500,000 to 700,000 people were dying in Asia every month before the atomic bomb was dropped.

Over the fantasy timeline of surrender after just one year, the cruel math works out to anywhere from 6 million to 7.2 million people dying while the world waited for Tokyo to give in. And since that’s based on the actual observed fatality rate in mid-1945, which doesn’t include Japanese starvation numbers under a blockade scenario, the real death toll would be even higher.

On a more realistic timeline, if the blockade took two or three years to produce a surrender, that works out to something between 15 million to 21 million more dead. Admittedly though, by that point there may not have been enough living civilians left in Vietnamese and Indonesian famine zones to starve at the previous rate.

So the bomb critics who advocate blockade should choose: 

A. 150,000 dead to end the war immediately.

B. 15 to 21 million dead “waiting it out.”

Of course even Parshall argues these are only best estimates based on the data we have, so a skeptic could assume the numbers are too high. But even if the death toll is a few million overstated, Allied planners would still be faced with an atomic bomb solution that kills 150,000 versus a blockade that kills, say… “only” 4 million to 15 million depending how long it lasts.

And if the Allies had elected blockade and millions more died, the Correspondent can guarantee the bomb critics would accuse Harry Truman of war crimes for “choosing to kill millions of civilians throughout Japanese-occupied Asia when he could have ended the war quickly with the atomic bomb.”

The blockade option is immoral for one more reason: the Economics Correspondent has long considered it a strange and even perverse morality that cares more about the deaths of 150,000 Japanese than the deaths of millions in her conquered territories.

The 150,000 victims in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 40,000 of whom were military, were citizens of the belligerent country that invaded its neighbors for years to satisfy imperial ambitions of colonialism and racial domination.

The latter 6 million to 21 million, who critics of the bomb choose to kill in order to spare 150,000 Japanese, were citizens of the “victim” countries that had done nothing to warrant unprovoked Japanese invasion and mass slaughter.

The final, inescapable, twisted logic is “millions of lives in the invaded countries are worth less than 150,000 in the invading one.” 

Parshall, being more generous and accusing bomb critics of being more ignorant than callous or ideological, argues “what they fail to realize is just the scale of human devastation in wider Asia.”

A Political and Economic History of China Addendum: Critics of the Atomic Bomb, Part 2 of 4

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Photo: Japanese women train with spears to fight invading American GI's in the “Glorious Death of One Hundred Million” mobilization campaign.

6 MIN READ - The Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs continues his mini-series on the atomic bomb, this time refuting the argument that fewer lives would have been lost by simply invading and occupying Japan without destroying Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Originally the Correspondent thought it would take three columns to refute the most common arguments against using the atomic bomb in World War II, but the sheer amount of history he needs to document will require a fourth.

In this column we’ll address the second common criticism of the decision to use the bomb:

2) “Estimates of Allied casualties in a conventional invasion/occupation of the home islands were wildly overstated. A conventional military invasion of Japan would have been less deadly than using the atomic bomb.”

During the summer of 1945 Allied war planners forecasted unthinkable casualties if U.S. and supporting British/Australian/Canadian troops attempted to invade the Japanese home islands. Most postwar historians agree.

Although the numbers vary, most estimates for Allied casualties range from 250,000 to nearly one million (dead plus wounded). To put that in perspective the United States suffered one million casualties in all of World War II of which 291,000 were battle deaths.

In addition to Americans, estimates of Japanese casualties, military and civilian combined, numbered in the several millions.

Hence the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing upwards of 150,000 people. 

The civilian death count was still appalling although mitigated by two factors: First, U.S. bombing warning leaflets had been dropped over most Japanese cities urging citizens to evacuate including Hiroshima, reducing its population modestly before the attack...

(see "LeMay Leaflets")

https://ww2db.com/image.php?image_id=7350

And second, 40,000 of those living in Hiroshima were military, stationed at the Second Army General Headquarters which was responsible for the southern defense of Kyushu. The presence of the Army Command that would coordinate resistance against the Kyushu invasion was a major factor in the USA’s decision to select Hiroshima as a target.

But critics of the bombing still maintain Allied casualty estimates have been wildly overstated, both by the U.S. War Department and modern day historians, and that the Allies could have invaded and pacified Japan for far less than 150,000 deaths—Allied soldier, Japanese military, and Japanese civilian alike.

Using one customary example the late libertarian historian Ralph Raico, writing for the Ludwig von Mises Institute and making a case for trying Harry Truman as a war criminal, argued “the worst-case scenario for a full-scale invasion of the Japanese home islands was forty-six thousand American lives lost.”

Raico’s source was Stanford historian Barton Bernstein whose research, also criticizing the unnecessary use of the bomb, calculated the same fatality estimate: only 46,000 Americans dead.

Some readers may find such a low forecast and others like it beyond belief, and for good reason. Simply applying lessons learned from past Pacific battles reveals the outlandishness of artificially depressing the numbers that low.

The U.S. suffered nearly 20,000 dead fighting for two rocks in the Pacific—Iwo Jima and Okinawa—with another 56,000 wounded

The Japanese suffered 115,000 dead on the same two islands and another 40,000-150,000 civilians died in Okinawa.

In both battles the USA enjoyed a 5-to-1 advantage in manpower.

Total casualties on both sides? 175,000-285,000 dead and at least 60,000 wounded.

And taking Japan itself would be a monumentally larger operation for which the Allies planned a two-invasion campaign. First would come beach landings on the home island of Kyushu (Operation Olympic), then clearing out and occupying the southern third of the island, an area of about 4,000 square miles.

Kyushu's ports and airfields would then be used to stage the second, larger invasion of Tokyo and the Kanto Plain—about 6,200 square miles—in March of 1946, dubbed Operation Coronet.

Thus the Allies aimed to invade and occupy 10,200 square miles of Japanese territory, more than 13 times larger than Okinawa and Iwo Jima combined. And unlike the latter two, which were surrounded by ocean in all directions, the occupied regions of Kyushu and Honshu would remain adjacent to Japanese controlled territory and thus subject to constant infiltration and counterattack.

In January 1945 the U.S. began making plans to invade Kyushu with 766,000 men, ten times the number of Americans at Normandy which to this day remains the largest amphibious invasion in history. According to intelligence reports there was only a single IJA division defending the island.

However after losing Okinawa Japanese strategists correctly anticipated Kyushu would be the Allies’ next objective, and by July 1945 the IJA had deployed 900,000 men and several tank brigades to defend the limited number of suitable landing grounds. 10,000 attack planes were also apportioned to Kyushu, most of which would be used in kamikaze attacks against offshore U.S. Navy ships.

Instead of a 5-to-1 advantage the Allies were now faced with parity which U.S. war planners were reluctant to accept.

Furthermore the Japanese government had mobilized every able-bodied adult—men, women, and students—to resist the invasion for the “Glorious Death of One Hundred Million” campaign. Footage of young Japanese women being trained with bamboo spears still exists in the archives today.

Had the Allied invasion proceeded then today we would undoubtedly have archival footage of spear-wielding Japanese women being machine-gunned or flame-thrown by U.S. Marines. And today’s A-bomb critics would instead be castigating “the brutal killing of Japanese women when the war could have been ended quickly with the atomic bomb."

To think that after fighting Japan for 770 square miles, with a 5-to-1 advantage and losing 20,000 dead, the U.S. would somehow only suffer 46,000 dead fighting at parity against 900,000 Japanese soldiers in Kyushu alone, 10,000 attack planes, and two million armed civilians over 4,000 square miles is pure fantasy resembling wartime propaganda.

And that's just Act One.

Remember more casualties were anticipated for 1946’s even larger Operation Coronet where Allied soldiers would invade the much larger, more heavily populated island of Honshu and engage in door-to-door urban fighting for Japan’s largest city and capital, although admittedly a great deal of Tokyo’s structures had been destroyed during the U.S. firebombing in March.

Moreover the USA lost nearly 20,000 dead over two rocks that most Japanese never considered part of the homeland. The level of fanatical resistance would have only increased when invading Kyushu and Honshu, the capital city of Tokyo, and the imperial palace.

Also keep in mind that Iwo Jima was devoid of civilians (already evacuated) and Okinawan civilians were not combatants, yet 40,000-150,000 of them died anyway. In Japan tens of millions of civilians were mobilized as militia to battle against Allied troops on the home islands. 

The painful process of neutralizing militarized civilian resistance may also have extended beyond just southern Kyushu and the Kanto Plain—to the entire country—if the emperor never gave the order to surrender or perished before he could issue such an order.

Disruption of what little economy Japan had left during the fighting would have also led to more deaths by starvation as hunger was already gripping Japan by mid-1945.

The estimates of many millions of Japanese dead are absolutely realistic.

And foreshadowing the subject of our next column, American and Japanese death counts would have to be doubled for those who remember the millions more victims who critics of the bomb callously disregard: the peoples of Japanese-occupied countries who were already dying in large numbers and would continue to die throughout Asia while the invasion dragged on. 

Assuming very optimistically that the invasion wrapped up by summer of 1946 an estimated 4 to 5.6 million more civilians—mostly in China, Indonesia, and Vietnam—would have perished while waiting for the Japanese surrender to finally come. 

More details on that macabre calculus in Part 3, but due to the atomic bomb those 4 to 5.6 million Chinese, Vietnamese, and Indonesians lived instead.

“Worst case only 46,000 American lives lost” is wishful thinking for the ideologically predisposed: critics who start from a premise that the Allies possessed a long list of peaceful, bloodless options to end the war, but that Harry Truman callously chose to ignore them all. 

Simple historical facts, like casualty figures from the Pacific battles of early 1945, dispel such fantasies.

The very ugly nature of the choices the Allies faced has been better summarized by knowledgeable historians: a list of exclusively horrible options for the Allies, the Japanese, and the people of Japanese-occupied Asia, with the atomic bomb being the least worst solution by far. Those critics who argue a full invasion of Japan or a blockade (coming in the next column) “wouldn’t have been that bad” enjoy the luxury of living in an alternate reality that American war planners and Harry Truman did not.

A Political and Economic History of China Addendum: Critics of the Atomic Bomb, Part 1 of 4

Click here to read the original Cautious Optimism Facebook post with comments

6 MIN READ - By tackling this subject the Economics Correspondent is straying a bit from the current series’ core topic of Chinese history.

However there is a connection to our previous columns. The atomic bombings quickly ended the war in China along with the mass killing of millions of its civilians.

Our last article’s subject—General Douglas MacArthur’s decision to grant immunity to Unit 731 scientists, a notorious Japanese biological weapons program based in China that committed horrific experiments against live civilians—in exchange for their research is also tangentially related. 

Today many critics slam MacArthur and the United States as greedy biological weapons peddlers when in fact the immunity deal’s real motivation was a threat by Japanese scientists to hand over their data to the Soviet Union if they were prosecuted.

Likewise President Harry Truman is criticized as wicked for ordering the needless use of the atomic bomb.

As the topic still remains controversial today, as opinions vary even within CO Nation, and as Cautious Optimism doesn’t censor civil discourse, comments and opinions are welcome.

IMPERIAL JAPAN IN MID-1945

Whenever debate resurfaces over America’s decision to use the atomic bomb most Americans maintain the view it was a tragic but necessary evil to end World War II quickly.

The Japanese not only refused to surrender, they also employed the “Shosango” strategy of bleeding the U.S. with massive casualties to discourage invasion of the home islands in hopes of a more favorable negotiated peace. Furthermore the Japanese war cabinet’s later plan “Ketsugo” was inspired by the ancient bushido code, preferring to fight fanatically to the death over surrender while ordering millions of Japanese civilians to either die in battle or commit mass suicide.

But the Economics Correspondent has also heard plenty of condemnation of America’s use of the bomb, usually by far-left “America is evil” liberals, or from “always blame America” styled libertarians. To support these denunciations the critics have offered up a litany of reasons why dropping the bomb was not only unnecessary but also an immoral act since, according to them, there were better options available to the Allies that would have achieved peace with far less loss of life on both sides.

The Correspondent wishes to address these criticisms, none of which he believes hold merit with one possible exception on practical grounds which he’ll discuss in the last installment.

We’ll start this first column with the single most complicated criticism to rebuke:

1) “Dropping the bomb was unnecessary because Japan was just about to surrender. Harry Truman used the bomb anyway because he stubbornly insisted on nothing short of unconditional surrender.”

This argument is usually rebuked by people who remember that Japan still refused to surrender even after Hiroshima was destroyed by the “Little Boy” atomic bomb. If the Japanese government was one breath away from surrendering before Hiroshima, why did it refuse to surrender after?

Historians have also long known that after the second atomic attack on Nagasaki and Soviet declaration of war on Japan, the imperial cabinet was still divided fifty-fifty on the question of surrender. After a stalemate Emperor Hirohito finally stepped in and broke the deadlock, ordering Japan’s capitulation to avoid, as he stated in his surrender radio broadcast, “an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation.”

 This small fragment of history alone dispels the myth that Japan was just one breath away from surrendering before the Enola Gay destroyed Hiroshima.

But there’s more evidence, perhaps less commonly known, that disassembles what is effectively the “just about to surrender" fable.

Let’s start at the beginning.

By the summer of 1945 the Japanese war cabinet knew they were losing badly, but the so-called “Big Six” cabinet members—comprised of the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, War Minister, Navy Minister, and Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff—wanted to achieve a face-saving resolution that offered favorable terms to Japan.

U.S. President Harry Truman demanded an unconditional Japanese surrender, but one high ranking Japanese official devised a compromise suggestion which he floated by the Big Six. Lord Privy Seal Koichi Kido, one of Hirohito’s more dovish advisors, proposed the following counteroffer of revised surrender terms to the Allies, dubbed the "four conditions”…

1. The Emperor shall retain his throne as head of state.
2. No war crimes trials will be conducted.
3. No Allied soldiers shall set foot on Japanese soil.
4. The Allies will not disarm the Japanese military. Rather, the Japanese military will disarm itself.

There was a fifth condition that wavered slightly and is not part of the bigger four:

5. Japan will keep all of its conquered territories.

However at times Kido considered concessions on this last condition including one that Japan might consider returning “former Western colonies,” implying the relinquishment of Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines (which Japan had already effectively lost), Burma (also effectively lost), and possibly Vietnam and Indonesia.

Anyone reading the “four conditions,” with or without the fifth, can tell it was not a surrender. 

It was a ceasefire proposal, and one with no change in the Japanese war government’s disposition, no accountability for any war crimes, no respite for the hundreds of millions of Asian civilians still suffering under Japan’s murderous occupation, and in practice no enforceable disarmament.

And despite such ridiculously favorable terms for Japan, the Big Six rejected Kido’s proposal for being too generous to the Allies.

So much a second time for the “just about to surrender” legend.

(the Economics Correspondent recommends CO readers consider a simple Google search on “Japan four conditions” to corroborate these little know surrender terms)

Nevertheless the Emperor asked Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo to contact Moscow and probe Soviet willingness to act as mediator for prospective peace talks with the Allies.

Unbeknownst to Japan, Joseph Stalin had already committed to break his neutrality pact and invade Manchuria, a pledge he made to late U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt going back to the Cairo and Yalta Conferences. Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov stretched out peace discussions using delay tactics, giving Japan false hope with no intention of ever brokering a peace.

After the revelation of the atomic bomb and August 6th destruction of Hiroshima the Japanese war cabinet reconvened to discuss their deteriorating position. Kido floated his “four conditions” surrender idea again. They were completely unchanged from his first proposal.

Once again the Big Six rejected the terms. 

And once again, the “Japan was just on the cusp of surrendering before Hiroshima” fable is refuted. 

So much too for the “Japan only objected to unconditional surrender” argument, since they also objected to war crimes trials, military disarmament, any Allied presence on Japanese soil, and giving up their conquests in China, Korea, Taiwan, and conceivably other countries.

And all this after Hiroshima.

On August 9th the “Fat Man” atomic bomb destroyed Nagasaki while the Soviet Union simultaneously invaded Manchuria, overrunning Japan's dilapidated Kwantung Army.

The war cabinet convened yet again. Given the increasingly hopeless prospects for face-saving peace, the subject of unconditional surrender was finally discussed seriously.

Yet the Big Six were still divided, deadlocked three against three.

Despite the total destruction of two cities, the threat of more atomic bombs raining down on Japan, the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, prospects of the USSR invading Sakhalin Island, the Kuril Islands, and Hokkaido (the first two ultimately materialized, the third did not), War Minister Korechika Anami, navy chief Soemu Toyoda, and army chief Yoshijiro Umezu still argued for fighting on.

On the possibility of Japan being completely destroyed by atomic bombs War Minister Anami argued the complete annihilation of the Japanese race was preferable to the dishonor of surrender. 

Reflecting the fanaticism of the bushido code prevalent in WWII Japanese militarism, Anami likened the extinction of all Japanese people in nuclear fire to a delicate flower wilting in the flames of an inferno. “Would it not be wondrous for this whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower?” he asked. 

The cabinet ultimately reached an impasse.

Side note: Five days later Anami signed the instrument of surrender aboard the USS Missouri and committed seppuku suicide the next morning.

From here the story becomes better-known again. The emperor stepped in to break the deadlock, ordering an unconditional surrender. 

Deferring to the infallibility of imperial edict the cabinet complied but managed to preserve a single condition that the emperor remained head of state. Luckily for both the war cabinet and citizens of Tokyo—which Truman considered as a target for the third atomic bombing—the Allies accepted the sole remaining condition.

In Part 2 we’ll discuss prospective casualty numbers from a conventional invasion of the Japanese home islands.

Trump's Tariffs are *not* Smoot-Hawley. Here's Why.

Click here to read the original Cautious Optimism Facebook post with comments

Photo: Typical media headline warning 2025 tariffs will start another Great Depression

8 MIN READ - The Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs chimes in detail on Trump’s retaliatory tariff policies, strictly from a historical point of view. This might take a few minutes so have a seat.

Donald Trump’s strategy of using retaliatory tariffs to pressure America’s trading partners to lower longstanding protectionist barriers has launched a firestorm of controversy and debate, even here on the Cautious Optimism page.

While the Economics Correspondent’s position on Trump’s strategy tends to lean towards in favor, much more so in the case of China, the crosshairs of this article will be aimed squarely at critics who have compared Trump to Herbert Hoover signing the Smoot-Hawley Tariff.

Those who have resurrected the ghost of Smoot-Hawley include most of the usual suspects who will criticize Trump for anything: suddenly self-anointed tariff experts at CNN, Paul Krugman at the New York Times—who urged tariffs against China when Obama was president, but now scathes Trump for them—and the rest of the Trump Derangement crowd.

But the Correspondent has read many free market economists—people he reads, follows, and respects—liken Trump’s tariffs to Smoot-Hawley as well. 

For example, 150 free market economists recently signed the “Trade and Tariffs Declaration: A Statement on the Principles of American Prosperity" opposing Trump. Their names include Don Boudreaux (co-author), David Henderson, Ben Powell, and Deidre McCloskey, and the declaration warns Trump’s policies “repeat the catastrophic errors of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930.”

The Economics Correspondent maintains a large degree of respect for all these economists, some of whom he’s communicated with and learned from over the years. But he’ll argue here that comparing Trump’s tariffs to Smoot-Hawley is not only a faulty parallel. He’ll go even further by contending that the 1930 tariff and Herbert Hoover’s trade policy were near-mirror opposites of Donald Trump’s.

2025: SMOOT-HAWLEY IN REVERSE

Back in 2018 the Correspondent wrote a three-part detailed history of Smoot-Hawley as part of his larger Great Depression series. For those who wish to revisit those columns, links are available at the end of this article.

Before getting into why Trump’s tariff policy is nearly the opposite of Herbert Hoover’s, the Economics Correspondent wants to agree with the consensus on one major aspect of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff: although the tariff and the international response were major contributors that made the Great Depression worse, it did not “cause” the 1930’s downturn.

The Correspondent agrees the Federal Reserve’s failure to stop nearly 10,000 banks from failing, the resulting monetary contraction, Herbert Hoover and FDR’s attempts to artificially boost prices and wages with widespread government price controls, and the two presidents’ fiscal policies were all larger factors.

For example, Herbert Hoover doubled federal spending in real terms and raised the top income tax from 25% to 63% in the middle of a major depression. FDR then raised the top rate to 79% in 1936, and both presidents raised tax rates for income earners at all levels.

All of these were far larger factors than trade. The Correspondent’s rough estimates are that America’s decline in international trade accounted for at most 13%-14% of its fall in GDP. The other 86%-87% was attributable to other factors.

However the Correspondent repeats: Trump’s retaliatory tariffs are n͟o͟t͟ Smoot-Hawley, and in many ways they’re the exact opposite for a variety of reasons. 

Let’s go through them one-by-one.

1) In 1930 Herbert Hoover really did start a trade war—by initiating (the key distinction here being “initiating”) the Smoot-Hawley Tariff against other countries who were not doing the same to the United States.

In Donald Trump’s time trading partners in the European Union, Asia, and China in particular initiated the trade war by launching protectionism policies against the United States, sometimes literally for decades. These have included: tariffs, central bank foreign currency exchange rate intervention, import quotas, and intellectual property theft.

For the “Trade and Tariffs Declaration” to be historically accurate, it should accuse many of America’s trading partners of repeating the mistakes of Smoot-Hawley, not the USA and Donald Trump.

2) After launching Smoot-Hawley, America’s trading partners quickly retaliated with their own tariffs, leading to a slowdown in international trade. 

In response to those retaliations many of the economists who’ve signed the Trade and Tariffs Declaration correctly fault Herbert Hoover to this day while maintaining a “Well, of course they [America’s trading partners] were going to retaliate” position.

In 2025, by being the country that’s retaliating to longstanding foreign tariffs, the United States is playing the role of Canada and Europe in the 1930’s, the same countries most economists absolve in the Smoot-Hawley story. Yet the Correspondent has yet to hear a single economist say “Well of course the USA is going to retaliate against decades of overseas protectionism,” all while fallaciously comparing Trump to Herbert Hoover.

(For the record the Correspondent does not support retaliatory tariffs imposed, perhaps erroneously, on zero tariff countries that don’t restrict U.S. imports such as Singapore)

Again, the Smoot-Hawley analogy completely reverses roles, and blame, here. 

3) In 1930 the United States was a huge trade surplus country and the European nations ran huge trade deficits. This is all the more reason Smoot-Hawley was a terrible idea: putting up protectionist barriers to expand the USA’s already large trade surplus.

However in 2025 the United States is a huge trade deficit country. 

This doesn’t necessarily mean tariffs are an automatic no-brainer, but a large reason the USA runs such an oversized trade deficit is tariffs and other protectionist policies long-imposed by its trading partners. Meanwhile China, the largest trade surplus country in the world, has continued with its nearly half century of protectionist barriers, also a terrible idea.

Once again, the USA and Donald Trump in 2025 are playing the exact opposite role of Herbert Hoover in 1930.

4) In 1930 the United States was a huge creditor nation and most of its trading partners were indebted to it. The main reason was World War I. To foot the huge bill to fight history’s first-ever world war the European Allies borrowed heavily from what was by then the world’s largest economy: the USA.

In 2025 the United States is a huge debtor, not creditor, country.

For a fourth time, the United States in 2025 represents the anti-Smoot-Hawley position.

5) In 1930 most of America’s trading partners needed to run trade surpluses to repay war debts to the United States. Therefore choking off their exports with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff was a particularly bad idea.

Today the U.S. government owes a great deal of money to foreign governments and investors. While today’s debt is mostly the result of reckless domestic spending rooted in Washington DC itself, not a world war, a more balanced trade arrangement would increase domestic GDP—GDP being the sum of consumer, investment, and government purchase spending plus net exports—and make repaying that debt a little easier (provided Washington politicians don’t simply find new ways to spend the money).

Yet another diametric opposite Smoot-Hawley correlation.

Side note: If anyone is wondering why European countries running a trade surplus in 1930 to repay the USA was a good thing, keep in mind that Americans would hand over cash (converted to gold in the early 1930’s) for those European exports, and the Europeans would hand that cash (converted to gold) right back to the United States as a debt repayment. So when the smoke cleared America was effectively being repaid with free goods and services. Smoot-Hawley cut off that repayment mechanism.

6) Herbert Hoover launched the Smoot-Hawley Tariff even as the United States, in fact the entire world, was clearly entering a historic depression.

Today the United States and the world are neither in nor already entering a major depression. In fact, the Economics Correspondent would argue if Donald Trump looked around at the state of the economy today and it mirrored that of July 1930, he would put his trade policy on hold.

7) Finally, one of the only Smoot-Hawley analogies that holds up but which is never mentioned.

When Canada and European trading partners retaliated with their own tariffs in the 1930’s, America felt the painful impact on its exports immediately.

In fact the effects were so pronounced that one of incoming President Franklin Roosevelt’s first policy initiatives—after addressing the 1933 banking crisis—was to send Secretary of State Cordell Hull from country to country to negotiate bilateral removals of tariffs and trade barriers, successfully eliminating Smoot-Hawley and restoring America’s relationship with the world to the far freer trade environment of pre-1930.

In other words, retaliation by trading partners succeeded in getting the tariff initiator—the United States—to abandon its protectionist policies, i.e. it worked.

This is what Donald Trump has repeatedly said his motivation for introducing reciprocal tariffs has been all along, another example of Trump playing the role of 1930’s Canada and Europe. But the fact that the 1930’s retaliation worked is never mentioned in the Smoot-Hawley allegory which instead focuses on framing Trump as Herbert Hoover.

TWO MORE THINGS....

A couple of final words on the subject of retaliation.

First, there are those who believe Trump is really only adopting a free trade position as a cover to protect American workers. Some believe if one day he gets free trade but feels the smaller deficits are still too big—deficits defined as goods deficit + services surplus + investment flows surplus +  unilateral transfers + reserve currency benefits—then he will abandon free trade and adopt naked protectionism instead.

The Economics Correspondent won’t rule out this possibility, but right now who cares what Trump might do if and once he’s successful achieving global free trade?

Pressuring much of the world to return to a trade barrier-free arrangement is a laudable goal worth supporting. The Economics Correspondent believes Trump’s critics are wrong by fighting to preserve worldwide unilateral protectionism all because of what he “might try to do” after he’s achieved free trade. 

Now if Trump was actually successful in getting most or all trade barriers removed across the board—something the Correspondent is skeptical he can achieve in full in just three and a half years—and he tried to launch new, unilateral protectionist tariffs, the critics would then have a point, but only then.

And the Economics Correspondent would probably join them.

Second and lastly, some might argue “Well those Europeans and Canadians retaliating in the 1930’s gave us the Great Depression. It’s not worth another Great Depression just to get trade barriers reduced.”

But as the Economics Correspondent has already pointed out, the world’s economic conditions today are not those of the 1930’s. Retaliatory tariffs may temporarily hurt trade, but arguing they’d usher in another Great Depression is just irrational scaremongering.

In the 1930’s the U.S. banking system literally collapsed due to anti-branching unit bank laws that no longer exist.

The Federal Reserve, which had nationalized the lender of last resort function from the private sector, not only sat on its hands when the crisis came, it actually deliberately “punished” many banks straight into failure (its policy was named “Direct Pressure”).

Tax rates were raised from 25% to 79%. 

Real government spending doubled from 1929 to 1933 (Barack Obama increased real federal spending by 16% from 2009 to 2017). 

Prices fell by 30%.

(Which in itself isn’t Great Depression-inducing as evidenced by the 40% deflation in 1839-43 where GDP grew by % a year)

…but Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt imposed strict and inflexible price and wage floors that ballooned unsold products and unsold labor, i.e. mass unemployment.

The list of government screwups and other non-comparable factors during the Great Depression goes on, but the larger point is anyone who claims U.S. retaliatory tariffs designed to stimulate bilateral reductions in trade barriers will result in Great Depression 2.0 either doesn’t know Great Depression history or is simply exaggerating for scare effect.

A more detailed history of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff can be read on the Economics Correspondent’s archive at:

https://www.cautiouseconomics.com/2018/03/the-great-depression-09.html

https://www.cautiouseconomics.com/2018/05/the-great-depression-10.html

https://www.cautiouseconomics.com/2018/06/the-great-depression-11.html