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8 MIN READ - If anyone has the slightest doubt that communists are born professional liars, the Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs suggests reading how the CCP duped the United States into handing them victory over Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government during the Chinese Civil War.
Photo: Trickster and unwitting pawn: CCP negotiator Zhou Enlai (right) and American diplomatic envoy George C. Marshall (center). Nationalist/KMT negotiator Zhang Qun is on the left.
In the last column we outlined how President Harry Truman and his U.S. diplomatic envoy General George C. Marshall tried to broker a peace agreement and democratic power-sharing deal (the Marshall Mission) between China’s bitter enemies: Chiang Kai-shek’s ruling Nationalist government and Mao Zedong’s communist rebels.
During the bargaining process the Communists, represented by the intelligent and persuasive negotiator Zhou Enlai (who would soon become Chinese Premier), agreed to every concession requested by Marshall plus a few more of their own, but in practice kept none of their promises. The Nationalists (KMT), dealing more candidly with the Americans, agreed to some concessions but resisted others. As a result Marshall believed the Communists were negotiating in good faith and the Nationalists were obstructing the peace process.
Pressuring for greater cooperation, Harry Truman imposed an arms embargo on the Nationalists in mid-1946 preventing them from acquiring U.S. weapons and supplies, all while the Soviet Red Army was secretly furnishing the Communists with an enormous arms buildup.
After a year the Nationalists’ original material advantage had evaporated and the rest is history.
Here we’ll discuss the negotiations, promises, and betrayals in more detail.
MARSHALL BEGINS
When George C. Marshall, a career officer of deservedly-impeccable reputation, arrived in China for the 1946 New Year he was received by U.S. China theater commander Lt. General Albert Wedemeyer. Marshall briefed Wedemeyer on his diplomatic objective: brokering a ceasefire and forming a Chinese democratic power-sharing government.
Wedemeyer, having been in Asia for two years and serving as the highest ranking U.S. officer in China for the previous fifteen months, cautioned Marshall of the irreconcilable differences between China’s two antagonists, concluding…
”He [Marshall] would never be able to effect a working arrangement between the Communists and the Nationalists since the Nationalists, who still had most of the power, were determined not to relinquish one iota of it, while the Communists for their part were equally determined to seize all power, with the aid of the Soviet Union.”
In response…
“General Marshall reacted angrily and said: ‘I am going to accomplish my mission, and you are going to help me.’”
(both quotes from the Wedemeyer Report, submitted late 1947)
During negotiations Marshall pressed both sides for concessions. For the Communists, Marshall asked the CCP to recognize the KMT as the legitimate government of China and follow its orders, to refrain from cooperating with the Soviet Red Army in Manchuria, to wait for Japanese officers to surrender to arriving KMT representatives, to relinquish most communist-controlled territory, and to greatly reduce the size of its army.
We’ve already mentioned CCP envoy Zhou Enlai agreed to every demand Marshall made… on paper. In reality the Communists violated every agreement in practice.
Meanwhile Chiang Kai-shek resisted some of the concessions demanded of the Nationalists, frustrating Marshall even though Chiang explained to the American that the Nationalists were actually complying with far more of his requests than the Communists who would simply ignore all of theirs.
Marshall decided to inspect Communist territory for himself and flew to a dozen towns and cities in CCP-controlled areas where he was met with well-placed cheering crowds. Meeting directly with Mao Zedong and Zhu De, both of whom professed a desire for democracy in China, Marshall reported back to Washington that the meetings ‘had most happy results.”
Further distorting the U.S. delegation’s impressions was the fact that American cryptographers had broken Nationalist machine-encrypted messages which provided Marshall access to internal KMT diplomatic communications. The Communist delegation decrypted their messages with single-use “one time pads,” denying American intelligence any corresponding insights into their strategy.
Therefore Marshall was reading communiqués where Nationalist words didn’t always align with intentions, sowing a degree of mistrust. If Marshall had also enjoyed access to Communist communications he would have realized the CCP was engaged in an extensive deception operation and that Mao intended to break every promise he made (examples to follow).
Meanwhile Chiang, knowing the Communists were preparing for civil war, tried his best to position KMT forces within the constraints of Marshall’s demands. Mao was simultaneously positioning his own and, unlike Chiang, was receiving unconditional outside support from the Soviets. Since the U.S. delegation held leverage over the Nationalists but none over the Communists, Mao’s’ movements were completely unrestrained by any agreements which he simply ignored. In his diary Chiang expressed privately concerns that Marshall thought “he knew Chinese politics very well, but… does not.” Soon small skirmishes broke out along the southern border of Manchuria.
On a return visit to Washington Marshall’s reports were oblivious to any growing threat of civil war, declaring that both sides were…
“…now engaged in the business of demobilizing vast military forces and integrating and unifying the remaining forces into a central army.”
In a nod to the apparent success of his own efforts, Marshall called it…
“…very remarkable how we could straighten out what seemed impossible conditions… until we arrived, nothing could be done.”
KNEECAPPING THE NATIONALISTS
All throughout Marshall was convinced of the Communists’ sincere desire for a democratic China and believed Chiang Kai-shek’s intransigence was the main obstacle to peace. In mid-1946 Harry Truman turned up the pressure on Chiang by imposing an arms embargo on the Nationalist government, refusing to sell or deliver arms and supplies to the KMT, even those they had already paid for. The embargo would continue until Chiang demonstrated the same level of cooperation as the CCP.
Furthermore Marshall directly informed Zhou Enlai that the United States had ended “almost every direct support” for the Nationalist government, effectively telegraphing to the Communists that the KMT had been cut off by its strongest ally.
Privately the CCP’s leadership was delighted, not only to hear that the USA was abandoning Chiang’s government, but they also interpreted the news as a sign the United States was too weak militarily to intervene in the Chinese theater.
The Communists accordingly ramped up their offensive operations. Marshall, unaware that the CCP was adopting a more aggressive stance precisely because they knew Chiang was no longer supplied by the USA, received reports of elevated communist activity which he blamed on “radical elements” within the party. In Marshall’s mind, a few low-level CCP troublemakers were responsible for the infractions while the top leadership—comprised of Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai—were still negotiating in good faith.
As the Communists spread throughout Manchuria they violated more and more terms of the negotiated agreements, Chiang Kai-shek provided Marshall a list of recent communist transgressions including 287 PLA offensives and the capture of 13 Manchurian counties, 28 towns, and one major city. Marshall refused to place any blame on the CCP and even criticized an anti-communist protest in Nationalist-controlled Nanking for frightening the Communists into noncompliance.
When Marshall asked Zhou Enlai about the communist capture of a major city the envoy’s response was that his side “did not intend to monopolize Manchuria but instead desired international cooperation.” He also urged Marshall to pressure Chiang into accepting a cease-fire (that the Communists would again break when it was to their advantage). All along Mao Zedong instructed Zhou to remain friendly with Marshall so as to deny Chiang Kai-shek even “a crack to crawl through” while the People’s Liberation Army strove to seize “the golden opportunity that occurs once in a thousand years.”
Marshall later received reports that the Communists had taken over most of Manchuria with Soviet support, yet he mostly blamed the Nationalist government again. In his report to Truman, Marshall explained the Communists had acted out of fear due to the Nationalist government’s lack of good faith, and that a few KMT generals had misled Chiang into assuming too provocative a military stance. Therefore, according to Marshall, the Communists felt compelled to capture several cities because they held several “justified complaints” of Nationalist bad behavior.
THE ENDGAME
As it became clear that the CCP was blatantly violating all peace terms, and the Nationalists were responding with more aggressive military measures, talks began to collapse and Marshall became “more depressed every day” (The Marshall Papers). Yet even as the negotiations disintegrated Zhou Enlai continued to engage Marshall, trying to buy time to better arm, supply, and position PLA troops with Soviet assistance. While the communist delegation continued to lead the Americans on, Zhou reported by coded message to the CCP Central Committee that…
“The chances of making use of the United States and Marshall are diminishing daily… but we should still make every effort to delay the onset of civil war [until we are in a strong enough position].”
By early 1947 the mission had ended in failure. General Marshall returned to the United States to receive his appointment as new Secretary of State. By mid-1947 full, unrestrained warfare between the weakened Nationalists and vitalized Communists was underway and the United States realized Soviet support had strengthened the CCP immeasurably.
As a result the Truman arms embargo was lifted, yet there were scant few weapons available to sell to the Chinese government. For the previous eighteen months the United States was engaged in a huge military surplus demolition operation, destroying armaments which were amassed for the invasion of Japan but rendered unnecessary by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Since the end of the war General Wedemeyer, anticipating the Chinese government or even the United States might need those weapons someday, urged the wholesale destruction of Pacific theater supplies stopped but he was ignored. As a result, even after mid-1947 the USA had limited supplies to sell to the KMT. Meanwhile the Soviets continued to funnel arms through Manchuria to Mao Zedong’s Communists.
Even during the last year of the civil war, when the Communists had gained the decisive upper hand, the CCP still appealed to the USA for peace in order to confuse the Americans into hesitation, and perhaps even secure U.S. aid and support (!) for their own efforts.
In the summer of 1949 Zhou Enlai sent a direct communication to Harry Truman, appealing for American money and logistical support. Claiming he represented the “moderate wing” of the CCP, Zhou portrayed himself at odds with [future Chinese President] Liu Shaoqi whose hardline pro-Soviet faction was solely responsible for communist aggression. Although Truman declined Zhou's request for help, years later a senior communist official told an American scholar that Zhou’s communication had all along been a premeditated ruse to preclude potential last-minute military intervention by the United States.
Hence the United States, acting with the best of intentions, was unwittingly used to serve the CCP’s aims. Believing the Communists to be advocates of peace and democracy, the Marshall Mission accepted all CCP promises at face value while simultaneously tying the hands of Chiang Kai-shek for the offense of refusing to consent to every concession demanded, even as he warned the Communists intended to honor none their own.
Through the rest of his life Chiang Kai-shek never publicly blamed the United States for losing the civil war. Even when American rapprochement with Beijing began in the early 1970’s, an aging Chiang refused to take the bait when asked by reporters if America had “stabbed [Nationalist] China in the back.”
It would be interesting to know, in his final years, Chiang’s true private thoughts on the Marshall Mission.
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