A Political and Economic History of China, Part 39: Why the Communists Won the Civil War of 1946-1949, Soviet Intervention

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7 MIN READ - The Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs continues with his analysis of the Chinese Civil War, this time detailing how Soviet intervention and deception aided Mao Zedong’s communist victory.

Together at last: Mao and Stalin

In our last column we discussed American intervention’s role in providing the Chinese Communists a victory over Chiang Kai-shek’s seemingly larger and superior Nationalist (KMT) army. Both U.S. President Harry Truman and diplomatic envoy General George C. Marshall believed communist appeals for peace and democracy—all while the CCP broke every pledge it made—and tied Chiang Kai-shek’s hands with an arms embargo to pressure the Nationalist government into the same level of cooperation Mao Zedong’s communists professed to offer.

You can go back and read details of that sad story at:

https://www.cautiouseconomics.com/2025/10/china-history42.html

In this column we’ll discuss the role Joseph Stalin and the USSR played, aiding and supplying the Chinese Communists in a move that, unbelievably enough, took the U.S. government by surprise.

HELPING THE CCP?

To understand why Soviet support for Mao Zedong was a surprise to the U.S.—although it shouldn’t have been for more keen leadership—it’s helpful to remember that for eighteen years, from Chiang Kai-shek’s 1927 purge of the CCP to the closing months of World War II, Stalin had worked to keep Chiang in power and curbed Mao’s attempts to overthrow the Nationalist government.

Although fellow communist Mao may have seemed an obvious choice for Soviet backing, Stalin’s near-two decade pro-Chiang policy was a textbook case of rigid realpolitik and Soviet national security trumping ideological kinship.

The reason? Stalin’s primary concern from 1927 to 1945 was the Japanese threat to his east.

Ever since the 1905 Russo-Japanese war, when Japan defeated Imperial Russia and seized large tracts of Russian land and the port city of Dalian, Moscow viewed the Japanese as a constant threat. When Japan invaded and occupied all of Manchuria (1931) the Soviets suddenly found themselves with a new 2,600 mile border to defend as well.

Stalin’s mindset of Japanese treachery was on display during his Great Purge (1936-1938) during which many high ranking Soviet Communist Party officials were arrested, falsely tried, and executed on charges of Japanese espionage.

Since Chiang Kai-shek had control of the Chinese government and a large national army, but Mao Zedong had only a handful of rebel troops fighting a guerilla war, Stalin always favored Chiang who he viewed as more capable of resisting further Japanese incursions into China.

Thus for nearly two decades Chiang enjoyed a good working relationship with the Soviet leader, much to Mao’s irritation, until Japan was defeated by the Allies in 1945.

Once Japan was removed as a major threat, Stalin’s China policy changed completely because he no longer needed Chiang Kai-shek’s strong Chinese government. The benefits of a communist China to Russia’s south now seemed far more attractive. In the final year of the war Stalin’s allegiances changed and he shifted support from Chiang to the more ideologically inclined Mao, albeit quietly to avoid alerting either the Nationalist leader or his American allies.

SOVIET PROMISES

By early 1945 it was clear that Japan would lose the war and the “Big Three” of Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin began shaping their vision of a postwar Asia.

At the Yalta Conference (February, 1945) the Soviet delegation agreed to nearly all of Roosevelt’s China policy proposals. This primarily meant getting the USSR into the Pacific War by invading Manchuria within three months of Germany’s ostensibly inevitable surrender, thereby taking pressure off a prospective American invasion of the Japanese home islands. The Soviets also agreed to support a democratic power-sharing Nationalist/communist postwar government in China.

Stalin also pledged that until democracy was established in China “the Government of the USSR” would support only the central Nationalist government, but his language was deliberately worded to allow a backdoor loophole by which non-government bodies could still aid the Communists, such as the Soviet Communist Party or Comintern (Communist International).

When probed about possible Soviet sympathies for the Chinese communists, Stalin assured Roosevelt that Mao’s rebels were “not real communists,” referring to them as “radishes.” Besides, State Department officials told Roosevelt, the USSR was exhausted from years of war with Nazi Germany and eager to cooperate peacefully in world reconstruction with the global powers, not spreading global communist revolution.

The Americans were pleased with Soviet pledges, nearly all of which Moscow would violate in practice. Immediately after the Yalta meeting Stalin sent a secret cable to Mao Zedong instructing him to await Soviet support in overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek’s government while trumpeting “the Red Army is coming!”

ACTIONS, NOT WORDS

The Soviet Union invaded Manchuria on August 9, 1945. The Red Army’s 1.5 million troops easily overran Japan’s dilapidated Kwantung Army, Japan announced its surrender on August 15th, and the USSR had full control of the region in just eleven days.

During the temporary Soviet occupation Stalin also agreed that Japanese armies, POW’s, and puppet POW’s in Manchuria would only surrender to KMT troops, not to Mao’s communist army. However the Nationalist Army had insufficient railroad and truck capacity to transport enough troops to Manchuria; partly due to war damage, partly due to Nationalist corruption that misallocated funds, and into 1946 partly due to an arms embargo imposed by Harry Truman.

Therefore Chiang requested that the U.S. transport 400,000-500,000 KMT troops to Manchuria by ship which U.S. Lt. General Albert Wedemeyer arranged, reaching as far as just south of the Great Wall’s ocean terminus.

However when the USA tried to drop 200,000 KMT troops off at the large Manchurian port of Dalian the Soviets advised that, due to a technical clause in their 1905 treaty with Japan, the port could not be used for military purposes during peacetime.

After rejecting two more American requests to dock at Dalian Soviet General Rodion Malinovsky recommended the U.S. land at two small Manchurian ports further north. Once the American ships arrived they found the Soviets had already moved out and the docks were heavily fortified by Chinese communist troops. The Soviets refused to guarantee the safe landing of American vessels since their official position was “not to interfere in Chinese internal affairs”—all of course while they were quietly handing Japanese POW’s and Chinese puppet POW’s over to the CCP and arming Mao throughout Manchuria.

After months wasted sailing up and down the Chinese coastline the KMT troops had to be dropped off just south of the Great Wall again.

Chiang viewed all these Soviet activities as treachery and deception, but U.S. diplomatic envoy George C. Marshall continued to press forward with his idea of a Nationalist-Communist democratic coalition government.

Meanwhile the Soviets, who had pledged not to interact with or support Chinese communist soldiers, were asked by the U.S. State Department to confirm the Red Army was keeping its word. In response the Soviets reported they had not encountered any Chinese Communists in Manchuria at all, when in fact they were actively arming and supplying them, building up garrisons and fortifications for CCP use, and constructing a massive supply pipeline from Siberia into the Manchurian northeast.

During this time the CIA and its predecessor, the Central Intelligence Group, consistently reported that the Soviet Union was providing no aid of any kind to the Chinese Communists.

As we’ve discussed in previous columns, by the time widespread fighting began between the KMT and CCP, Soviet support had largely closed the Nationalist advantage in weaponry. Meanwhile Chiang Kai-shek suffered from a lack of supplies due to the one-year arms embargo imposed on his government by Harry Truman.

Even when the embargo was lifted, and the Nationalist government tried to buy more weapons, the U.S. had scant few to sell them due to its wholesale military surplus demolition in the Pacific. All the while Soviet material aid continued to pour into Manchuria, strengthening the Chinese Communists further and helping them gain the upper hand by late 1948.

In the last days of the civil war Stalin still remained focused on deception as a tool to neutralize any threat to his goal of achieving Chinese communism.

As the CCP’s position became insurmountable the Communists, who had previously flattered Marshall, praised the American delegation, and telegraphed warm sentiments to the State Department and the White House, abruptly shifted to a belligerent and contemptuous tone towards the Americans. As the Communists captured major Chinese cities they seized and openly looted American consulate buildings, even arresting some State Department officials.

Mao informed Stalin of this new anti-American policy, dubbed “cleaning house before entertaining guests.” Stalin, fearing angering the U.S. and providing a pretext for American intervention, ordered Mao to suspend his ransacking of U.S. buildings until the PLA had consolidated its gains and established total military control of the mainland. 

Once the CCP victory was complete the Communists safely recommenced their public disdain for the Americans.

Just as they had been fooled by the Chinese Communists, the U.S. government was also duped by promises of peaceful cooperation and Chinese democracy from Stalin. Both the Chinese and Soviet communists lied repeatedly to American government officials, pledging no civil war in China while in fact Mao and Stalin cooperated clandestinely towards that very goal.

The Economics Correspondent credits much of the material in both the American and Soviet intervention chapters to the late historian Jay Taylor's book "The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China." Taylor's biography of Chiang's son, also succeeding Taiwan president, is an equally fascinating read: "The Generalissimo's Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan."

A Political and Economic History of China, Part 38: Why the Communists Won the Civil War of 1946-1949, American Intervention

Click here to read the original Cautious Optimism Facebook post with comments

8 MIN READ - If anyone has the slightest doubt that communists are born professional liars, the Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs suggests reading how the CCP duped the United States into handing them victory over Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government during the Chinese Civil War.

Photo: Trickster and unwitting pawn: CCP negotiator Zhou Enlai (right) and American diplomatic envoy George C. Marshall (center). Nationalist/KMT negotiator Zhang Qun is on the left.

In the last column we outlined how President Harry Truman and his U.S. diplomatic envoy General George C. Marshall tried to broker a peace agreement and democratic power-sharing deal (the Marshall Mission) between China’s bitter enemies: Chiang Kai-shek’s ruling Nationalist government and Mao Zedong’s communist rebels.

During the bargaining process the Communists, represented by the intelligent and persuasive negotiator Zhou Enlai (who would soon become Chinese Premier), agreed to every concession requested by Marshall plus a few more of their own, but in practice kept none of their promises. The Nationalists (KMT), dealing more candidly with the Americans, agreed to some concessions but resisted others. As a result Marshall believed the Communists were negotiating in good faith and the Nationalists were obstructing the peace process.

Pressuring for greater cooperation, Harry Truman imposed an arms embargo on the Nationalists in mid-1946 preventing them from acquiring U.S. weapons and supplies, all while the Soviet Red Army was secretly furnishing the Communists with an enormous arms buildup.

After a year the Nationalists’ original material advantage had evaporated and the rest is history.

Here we’ll discuss the negotiations, promises, and betrayals in more detail.

MARSHALL BEGINS

When George C. Marshall, a career officer of deservedly-impeccable reputation, arrived in China for the 1946 New Year he was received by U.S. China theater commander Lt. General Albert Wedemeyer. Marshall briefed Wedemeyer on his diplomatic objective: brokering a ceasefire and forming a Chinese democratic power-sharing government.

Wedemeyer, having been in Asia for two years and serving as the highest ranking U.S. officer in China for the previous fifteen months, cautioned Marshall of the irreconcilable differences between China’s two antagonists, concluding…

”He [Marshall] would never be able to effect a working arrangement between the Communists and the Nationalists since the Nationalists, who still had most of the power, were determined not to relinquish one iota of it, while the Communists for their part were equally determined to seize all power, with the aid of the Soviet Union.”

In response…

“General Marshall reacted angrily and said: ‘I am going to accomplish my mission, and you are going to help me.’”

(both quotes from the Wedemeyer Report, submitted late 1947)

During negotiations Marshall pressed both sides for concessions. For the Communists, Marshall asked the CCP to recognize the KMT as the legitimate government of China and follow its orders, to refrain from cooperating with the Soviet Red Army in Manchuria, to wait for Japanese officers to surrender to arriving KMT representatives, to relinquish most communist-controlled territory, and to greatly reduce the size of its army.

We’ve already mentioned CCP envoy Zhou Enlai agreed to every demand Marshall made… on paper. In reality the Communists violated every agreement in practice.

Meanwhile Chiang Kai-shek resisted some of the concessions demanded of the Nationalists, frustrating Marshall even though Chiang explained to the American that the Nationalists were actually complying with far more of his requests than the Communists who would simply ignore all of theirs.

Marshall decided to inspect Communist territory for himself and flew to a dozen towns and cities in CCP-controlled areas where he was met with well-placed cheering crowds. Meeting directly with Mao Zedong and Zhu De, both of whom professed a desire for democracy in China, Marshall reported back to Washington that the meetings ‘had most happy results.”

Further distorting the U.S. delegation’s impressions was the fact that American cryptographers had broken Nationalist machine-encrypted messages which provided Marshall access to internal KMT diplomatic communications. The Communist delegation decrypted their messages with single-use “one time pads,” denying American intelligence any corresponding insights into their strategy. 

Therefore Marshall was reading communiqués where Nationalist words didn’t always align with intentions, sowing a degree of mistrust. If Marshall had also enjoyed access to Communist communications he would have realized the CCP was engaged in an extensive deception operation and that Mao intended to break every promise he made (examples to follow).

Meanwhile Chiang, knowing the Communists were preparing for civil war, tried his best to position KMT forces within the constraints of Marshall’s demands. Mao was simultaneously positioning his own and, unlike Chiang, was receiving unconditional outside support from the Soviets. Since the U.S. delegation held leverage over the Nationalists but none over the Communists, Mao’s’ movements were completely unrestrained by any agreements which he simply ignored. In his diary Chiang expressed privately concerns that Marshall thought “he knew Chinese politics very well, but… does not.” Soon small skirmishes broke out along the southern border of Manchuria.

On a return visit to Washington Marshall’s reports were oblivious to any growing threat of civil war, declaring that both sides were…

“…now engaged in the business of demobilizing vast military forces and integrating and unifying the remaining forces into a central army.”

In a nod to the apparent success of his own efforts, Marshall called it…

“…very remarkable how we could straighten out what seemed impossible conditions… until we arrived, nothing could be done.”

KNEECAPPING THE NATIONALISTS

All throughout Marshall was convinced of the Communists’ sincere desire for a democratic China and believed Chiang Kai-shek’s intransigence was the main obstacle to peace. In mid-1946 Harry Truman turned up the pressure on Chiang by imposing an arms embargo on the Nationalist government, refusing to sell or deliver arms and supplies to the KMT, even those they had already paid for. The embargo would continue until Chiang demonstrated the same level of cooperation as the CCP.

Furthermore Marshall directly informed Zhou Enlai that the United States had ended “almost every direct support” for the Nationalist government, effectively telegraphing to the Communists that the KMT had been cut off by its strongest ally. 

Privately the CCP’s leadership was delighted, not only to hear that the USA was abandoning Chiang’s government, but they also interpreted the news as a sign the United States was too weak militarily to intervene in the Chinese theater.

The Communists accordingly ramped up their offensive operations. Marshall, unaware that the CCP was adopting a more aggressive stance precisely because they knew Chiang was no longer supplied by the USA, received reports of elevated communist activity which he blamed on “radical elements” within the party. In Marshall’s mind, a few low-level CCP troublemakers were responsible for the infractions while the top leadership—comprised of Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai—were still negotiating in good faith.

As the Communists spread throughout Manchuria they violated more and more terms of the negotiated agreements, Chiang Kai-shek provided Marshall a list of recent communist transgressions including 287 PLA offensives and the capture of 13 Manchurian counties, 28 towns, and one major city. Marshall refused to place any blame on the CCP and even criticized an anti-communist protest in Nationalist-controlled Nanking for frightening the Communists into noncompliance. 

When Marshall asked Zhou Enlai about the communist capture of a major city the envoy’s response was that his side “did not intend to monopolize Manchuria but instead desired international cooperation.” He also urged Marshall to pressure Chiang into accepting a cease-fire (that the Communists would again break when it was to their advantage). All along Mao Zedong instructed Zhou to remain friendly with Marshall so as to deny Chiang Kai-shek even “a crack to crawl through” while the People’s Liberation Army strove to seize “the golden opportunity that occurs once in a thousand years.”

Marshall later received reports that the Communists had taken over most of Manchuria with Soviet support, yet he mostly blamed the Nationalist government again. In his report to Truman, Marshall explained the Communists had acted out of fear due to the Nationalist government’s lack of good faith, and that a few KMT generals had misled Chiang into assuming too provocative a military stance. Therefore, according to Marshall, the Communists felt compelled to capture several cities because they held several “justified complaints” of Nationalist bad behavior.

THE ENDGAME

As it became clear that the CCP was blatantly violating all peace terms, and the Nationalists were responding with more aggressive military measures, talks began to collapse and Marshall became “more depressed every day” (The Marshall Papers). Yet even as the negotiations disintegrated Zhou Enlai continued to engage Marshall, trying to buy time to better arm, supply, and position PLA troops with Soviet assistance. While the communist delegation continued to lead the Americans on, Zhou reported by coded message to the CCP Central Committee that…

“The chances of making use of the United States and Marshall are diminishing daily… but we should still make every effort to delay the onset of civil war [until we are in a strong enough position].”

By early 1947 the mission had ended in failure. General Marshall returned to the United States to receive his appointment as new Secretary of State. By mid-1947 full, unrestrained warfare between the weakened Nationalists and vitalized Communists was underway and the United States realized Soviet support had strengthened the CCP immeasurably. 

As a result the Truman arms embargo was lifted, yet there were scant few weapons available to sell to the Chinese government. For the previous eighteen months the United States was engaged in a huge military surplus demolition operation, destroying armaments which were amassed for the invasion of Japan but rendered unnecessary by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 

Since the end of the war General Wedemeyer, anticipating the Chinese government or even the United States might need those weapons someday, urged the wholesale destruction of Pacific theater supplies stopped but he was ignored. As a result, even after mid-1947 the USA had limited supplies to sell to the KMT. Meanwhile the Soviets continued to funnel arms through Manchuria to Mao Zedong’s Communists.

Even during the last year of the civil war, when the Communists had gained the decisive upper hand, the CCP still appealed to the USA for peace in order to confuse the Americans into hesitation, and perhaps even secure U.S. aid and support (!) for their own efforts. 

In the summer of 1949 Zhou Enlai sent a direct communication to Harry Truman, appealing for American money and logistical support. Claiming he represented the “moderate wing” of the CCP, Zhou portrayed himself at odds with [future Chinese President] Liu Shaoqi whose hardline pro-Soviet faction was solely responsible for communist aggression. Although Truman declined Zhou's request for help, years later a senior communist official told an American scholar that Zhou’s communication had all along been a premeditated ruse to preclude potential last-minute military intervention by the United States.

Hence the United States, acting with the best of intentions, was unwittingly used to serve the CCP’s aims. Believing the Communists to be advocates of peace and democracy, the Marshall Mission accepted all CCP promises at face value while simultaneously tying the hands of Chiang Kai-shek for the offense of refusing to consent to every concession demanded, even as he warned the Communists intended to honor none their own.

Through the rest of his life Chiang Kai-shek never publicly blamed the United States for losing the civil war. Even when American rapprochement with Beijing began in the early 1970’s, an aging Chiang refused to take the bait when asked by reporters if America had “stabbed [Nationalist] China in the back.”

It would be interesting to know, in his final years, Chiang’s true private thoughts on the Marshall Mission.