Sunday, April 4, 2021

Free vs Regulated Banking: Scotland’s Free Banking Era (Part 3 of 4)

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6 MIN READ - After being temporarily preoccupied with the Biden $1.9 trillion Covid stimulus package and $270,000-a-year government janitors in soon-to-be-bailed-out California, the Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs and Other Egghead Stuff returns to the history of free market banking in Scotland with the series’ third and penultimate column.

Demonstrators protest the U.K. Treasury
2008 bailout of the Royal Bank of Scotland

Up until now we’ve discussed the origins of the Scottish free banking system, its propensity for financial innovation, contribution to economic development, and most of all its remarkable stability especially compared to England. 

Given Scottish free banking’s remarkable performance, readers might pose two logical questions:

1. Were there literally zero bank regulations all that time?

2. Did Scottish free banking end? If so how, and what became of the industry?

We’ll cover these questions in this week’s column.

V. WHAT SCOTTISH BANKING WAS AND WASN’T 

It’s important to note that no serious student of the free banking era claims it was 100% free of all and any government control, although it was the closest to a laissez-faire banking system the post-Renaissance world has witnessed. 

The Economics Correspondent has only found three interventions (excluding the 1797 Suspension—to be covered last) in the entire 129 year period.

First, as noted in a previous column, British Parliament in 1765 outlawed use of the “option clause” that banks wrote onto their notes to delay specie redemption for up to six months paying interest to noteholders for their inconvenience.

Second, as part of the same 1765 act, the private issuance of banknote denominations under one pound was outlawed throughout all of Great Britain, a regulation intended to protect the poor and prevent the tiniest ventures from entering the bank of issue market. It was also likely a rare act of cronyism for the benefit of established banks across all of England, Wales, Ireland, and Scotland.

Third and lastly, of the 50+ banks operating in Scotland by the end of its free banking era, three were granted limited liability protection via state charter. The remainder operated under full liability until British Parliament made incorporated limited liability the law of the land in 1855. 

However, by 1855 Scotland’s free banking era had already been overturned de jure for a decade so universal limited liability never existed during the unregulated era. 

None of these three, relatively small regulations can be viewed as indispensable safeguards that shielded the industry from some otherwise certain crisis. Nevertheless their existence inclines Scottish banking expert Professor Lawrence H. White to describe the system as “very lightly regulated” while the Correspondent considers even White’s characterization an understatement.

Also no reader of Scottish free banking would venture to argue that it was a panacea or completely free of failures.

Banks did fail in Scotland from time to time, virtually always badly managed ones.

But substandard bank failures are a salutary event. Present day critics of bank bailouts rightly object that bad banks should be allowed to fail and well managed banks to replace them. Champions of statist control in banking counter that large failures can’t be permitted else a major crisis will ensue.

Well imprudent banks were allowed to fail in Scotland, and the result was no systemic crisis ever took place while the system was made better off for shedding poorly managed institutions.

In fact there was one large Scottish joint-stock bank that failed spectacularly in 1772: the Douglas Heron & Company, better known as the Ayr Bank (pronounced “air” bank). 

The Ayr Bank was reckless and overextended with bad loans, yet it limped along surviving for a few years on just-in-time revolving credit from the Neal, James, Fordyce and Down Bank in London.

But when the Crisis of 1772 struck England the Neal, James, Fordyce and Down Bank failed. With its London lifeline cut off the Ayr Bank quickly collapsed, which is precisely what should have happened. Savings and capital were shifted away from a wasteful institution that was channeling funds to value-destroying enterprises and redirected to more productive investments. 

After all, the replacement of failing firms with efficient ones is a fundamental tenet of progress under capitalism, and it’s precisely how the market disposed of the Ayr Bank.

Today the Ayr Bank would be deemed “too big to fail” and rescued by government regulators. Yet even with its spectacular collapse, the Ayr Bank produced little fallout and no systemic crisis ensued.

The private clearinghouse system had largely prepaid the Ayr Bank’s obligations to the joint-stock banks thus limiting contagion to a handful of smaller nonissuing private houses. And the Ayr Bank’s depositing customers were all paid 240 pennies on the pound with any shortfalls covered by the personal assets of the bank’s owners.

Furthermore the Ayr Bank’s failure served as a warning to other large Scottish banks that mismanagement would not be rewarded by government rescue. Its collapse taught other bankers a valuable lesson in accountability, and it’s no coincidence that no large joint-stock bank failed again for the 83-year remainder of Scotland’s free banking era.

VI. THE END OF THE SCOTTISH EXPERIMENT

Eventually free banking ended in Scotland.

The English Peel Act of 1844 was extended to Scotland in 1845 and Scottish banks were placed under the veritable domination of the Bank of England.

No new banks of issue were allowed to open, private banknote circulation was limited to that of May 1, 1845 (£3 million, an insignificant amount today but raised steadily over time), and the Bank of England obtained a monopoly on all remaining banknote issues outside of the Bank of Scotland, Royal Bank of Scotland, and Clydesdale Bank's limit.

In 1914 all of Great Britain went off the domestic gold standard and the Bank of England stopped gold payment to foreign central banks in 1931. 

Ironically once Scottish banking was placed under the Bank of England’s note monopoly, Scottish banks not only lost their resilience to panics but in a dramatic reversal they themselves became instigators of British crises—notably when the Western Bank of Scotland and City Bank of Glasgow failed, setting off the Crises of 1857 and 1878 respectively. 

Once the Bank of England adopted Bagehot’s Rule British banking under the gold standard generally stabilized, but by the late 20th century the United Kingdom had transitioned to a total fiat standard and its banks were highly regulated. 

Deposit insurance, introduced by the British government in 1979, encouraged moral hazard with both bankers and customers who were no longer as concerned with their banks’ financial soundness. And political interest groups had begun affecting lending policies although not nearly to the same degree as in the United States.

As the Bank of England coordinated a real negative interest rate policy with the world’s central banks in the early 2000’s, they collectively inflated dangerous housing bubbles in at least 32 countries—including the U.K.—which burst in 2006-07. 

When the global financial crisis of 2008 struck, the Bank of Scotland and Royal Bank of Scotland were no longer the solid, financially sound exemplars of the 19th century free banking era. Both were large U.K. market mortgage players. Both had also expanded into overseas mortgage markets—the Bank of Scotland primarily in Ireland, Australia, and continental Europe, the Royal Bank in the U.S. subprime securitization market. 

Loaded to the hilt with bad loans and holding lousy British, Australian, European, and particularly American mortgages the two venerable firms posted huge losses and quickly became insolvent.

These storied institutions, two of the world’s oldest banks with proud heritages of soundness and innovation, were forced to seek massive rescue packages from the British government. In an AIG-like bailout, the British Treasury bought 43% and 80% stakes in the Bank of Scotland and Royal Bank of Scotland. 

Five years later the Treasury sold its Bank of Scotland stake for a tiny £65 million profit. However twelve years after rescuing the Royal Bank of Scotland the British Treasury still sits on losses in the tens of billions of pounds.

Yet there is no shortage of critics on both sides of the Atlantic who continue to blame the Scottish banks’ failures on “deregulation,” “free market dogma,” and “unfettered capitalism.”

The Bank of Scotland and Royal Bank of Scotland names live on, the former as a unit of the Lloyds Banking Group. 

The Royal Bank of Scotland's name is now more hated in the U.K. than AIG, Goldman Sachs, and Lehman Brothers combined in the USA. Thus in 2020 RBS Group holding company rebranded itself as NatWest Banking Group (the Scottish banking unit remains RBS) which, despite an English title, remains an Edinburgh-headquartered enterprise. 

However NatWest is effectively government owned, the lingering aftermath of its Treasury equity investment, and the British government has no plans to divest its share ownership to private hands until at least 2025.

Thursday, April 1, 2021

Capital Theory: Productivity of the Ever Given vs 16th Century England's Merchant Fleet

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1 MIN READ - Cautious Rockers who monitored the temporary closure of the Suez Canal may have seen images of the Ever Given’s enormous stack of shipping containers. Imagining the sheer quantity of goods transported on that single vessel prompted the Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs and Other Egghead Stuff to dig up this impressive tidbit from economic history:

“Progress factoid: One modern container ship holds 3 times the cargo of the entire 16th century English merchant fleet and uses less than 1% of the crew.”

(H/T to George Mason University’s Lawrence H. White for posting this excerpt from the Financial Times)

The Economics Correspondent would also wager that container ship amenities for today’s crew of 22 are multitudes better than those of 16th century England's 16,000 merchant sailors—with ample food, climate control, laundry facilities, exercise, recreational, and medical facilities, private quarters, personal bath, television, computers/wi-fi, and more.

Container ship crew members also engage in far less strenuous physical labor, perform more interesting and safer work, probably work shorter hours, and enjoy standards of living at least a hundred times higher than their 16th century counterparts.

The Correspondent hopes to post a series of articles in the future on the subject of capital theory: a fancy way of describing “labor saving capital tools and machines that increase worker productivity and raise material living standards,” or the same economic force that makes the 21st century merchant crew’s life incalculably easier, safer, and wealthier than it was just fifty years ago let alone five hundred.

While the concept of capital machinery making life easier may seem childishly simple, closer study can reveal valuable truths about the nature of saving, investment, the investment and entrepreneur class, Marxism, labor unions, child labor, consumer costs, inflation, immigration, and even the boom/bust business cycle.

Given the list of subjects remaining on the Correspondent’s to-do list, capital theory may have to wait a while. In the meantime, the Ever Given and modern day container ships serve as just one illustrative example among history's tens of thousands that have delivered mankind from the caves into the ways of modern industry.

Friday, March 19, 2021

California Government: Land of Blue State Bailouts, $365,000 Lifeguards, $446,000 Sheriff’s Deputies, $207,000 Tree Trimmers, $270,000 Janitors, $486,000 Firemen, and More!

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4 MIN READ - From the Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs and Other Egghead Stuff.

As some Cautious Rockers already know, the Economics Correspondent lives (serves time, is incarcerated, repays his debt to society) in San Francisco. 

Now that we all know about the record $360 billion blue state bailout that is baked into the recent $1.9 trillion federal Covid-relief stimulus package, the Correspondent thought he’d share some of his experiences over the years with how California’s state and local governments wisely and responsibly spend their tax dollars, yet have found their finances in a precarious position by no fault of their own. Peruse through this short list at your leisure.

Corroborating links included with each of the roughly twenty examples.

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1) Let’s start with “Pelosi’s Tunnel” which is BART’s (Bay Area Rapid Transit) proposed extension line that they just don’t have the funds for since BART typically loses $30-$40 million a year.

The $140 million earmarked for Pelosi’s Tunnel was yanked at the last minute, but Bay Area property and sales taxes subsidize approximately $300 million of BART’s near $1 billion annual budget, and those cities and counties will be getting stimulus money in an indirect transfer from federal taxpayers to BART.

Moreover the BART 2020-21 annual report indicates the system already received approximately $250 million from the original 2020 CARES Acts. Nevertheless BART will continue to receive transfers from the local governments getting a slice of California’s over $30 billion Covid stipend from President Biden, errr… I mean the next generation of red state taxpayers.

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1A) 2017: A BART janitor makes $270,000 in one year with superhuman amounts of overtime, and is then caught by local news reporters sleeping on those overtime hours in a BART station supplies closet.

https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/BART-janitor-pay-270000-Powell-St-questions-10911932.php

The Correspondent saw the local news video where the reporters banged repeatedly for 10 minutes on the closet door before the janitor opened it, and it was clear from his face he had been sleeping.


1B) In 2012, 73% of BART workers earned over $100,000 in total compensation compared to San Francisco’s median individual income of $36,000 that same year. In 2019 dollars that’s $116,000 a year for BART workers vs San Francisco’s 2020 median individual income of $52,677 and the USA’s median income of $31,333.

https://www.econjobrumors.com/topic/73-of-bart-workers-make-100000-in-total-compensation


1C) Here’s just one BART station attendant who made over $200,000 in 2018. And a technician who rides the train and troubleshoots when something goes wrong made $253,000.

https://abc7news.com/bart-news-building-a-better-bay-area-overtime-pay/5953726/


1D) The Correspondent also has reliable inside information of BART ticket booth attendants earning $90,000 a year in pay back in the year 2000. In today’s money that’s $137,600 a year. He won’t share the details of his past interactions with those rude, lazy, and apathetic attendants behind the glass.

Of course these employees are all public union members.

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2) Most of us have heard about the “Poop Patrol” that cleans up human feces and syringes from the sidewalks of San Francisco. The job starts at $185,000 a year in pay and benefits.

https://www.theregister.com/2018/08/25/san_francisco_clean_up/

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3) Well maybe it would just be cheaper to have 24-hour public toilets instead, even though trust me when I say they’re absolutely disgusting.

No wait, at $28.50 per flush it’s not really cheaper after all.

https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/philmatier/article/SF-s-public-toilets-a-big-relief-and-the-14879898.php

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4) The Correspondent generally supports the police and definitely backs them in the whole “defund the police” and BLM mania of late. However as underpaid as many cops are in many red state cities, and as hard as their jobs are, there has to be *some* limit to their compensation in blue states.

Last year San Francisco’s top paid sheriff’s deputy—the same department that released Garcia Zarate to avoid ICE shortly before he shot and killed Kate Steinle—made $446,000.

Unfortunately it wasn’t a fluke. San Francisco’s top paid 19 deputies raked in an extra $4.16 million in overtime or an average of $219,000 on top of their base salary.

https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/SF-sheriff-s-deputies-top-earners-in-overtime-15470686.php

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5) The top paid San Francisco police officer made $592,000 last year although the city calls that a unique case.

https://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/Eight-of-the-Top-10-highest-paid-California-14049859.php

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6) But it’s not as unique as they’d like you to believe.

The Correspondent couldn't find the old article but remembers several years ago San Francisco’s highest paid employee being a police sergeant who made about $550,000 in a last year “pension spike” where his retirement pay for the rest of his life would be 95% of his final year’s compensation.

When asked if the pay was fair to the taxpayer he replied “I’ve paid plenty in taxes.”

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7) Not to be outdone Oakland’s top paid police officer made $490,000 in 2016.

https://blog.transparentcalifornia.com/2016/06/27/1137/

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8.) In 2017 San Jose’s Police Chief earned $497,000, right ahead of the City Manager who made $492,000. 

https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/05/01/oakland-engineer-gets-300000-ot-san-jose-city-manager-police-chief-highest-paid-in-state-survey-shows/

OK at least these are the Chief and the City Manager, but half a million dollars is still a bit high wouldn’t you say?

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9) Speaking of head honchos, San Francisco Mayor London Breed received $452,421 in total compensation last year ($342,974 of which was salary).

https://www.theepochtimes.com/san-francisco-officials-make-huge-salaries-but-cant-keep-human-waste-drug-needles-off-the-streets_3487185.html

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10) But let’s not forget the lesser employees just yet. And let’s not let the San Francisco Bay Area have all the fun either.

Back in 2011 the national news caught on that lifeguards in Orange County were making over $200,000 ($237,000 today adjusted for inflation).

https://www.ocregister.com/2011/05/10/lifeguarding-in-oc-is-totally-lucrative-some-make-over-200k/

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11) And let’s not let Orange County solely represent all of Southern California either. This year 20,000 city of Los Angeles employees averaged $150,000 a year including a “tree surgeon” (trimmer) making $207,058 and a fireman making $486,674.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamandrzejewski/2020/12/17/why-los-angeles-is-in-trouble--average-pay-for-20000-highly-compensated-city-employees-nears-150000/

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12) And let’s spread the wealth a little to all of California which includes both expensive cites and affordable rural areas. 

Last year 340,000 of the state’s public employees pulled in more than $100,000 a year in pay or pensions (which excludes non-cash benefits) including..

-truck drivers making $159,000

-an L.A. lifeguard making $365,000

-UCSF nurses making $501,000, and

-1,420 city employees who all make more than the 50 U.S. state governors

https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamandrzejewski/2020/05/19/why-california-is-in-trouble--340000-public-employees-with-100000-paychecks-cost-taxpayers-45-billion/?sh=1505a3f95fb8

California’s median individual income was $31,960 in 2019.

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13) And the same egregious offenses occur in other deep blue states that will be receiving federal bailout money although the Correspondent doesn’t know those examples as well.

But in 2010 a New Jersey toll booth attendant made $321,985 ($393,000 in 2020 dollars).

https://www.npri.org/new-jersey-toll-worker-earned-321985/

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14) During the Obama administration when controversies began to erupt that federal government employees were on average earning over double their counterparts in the private sector, the press asked why they were being paid so generously.

“Public employee unions say the compensation gap reflects the increasingly high level of skill and education required for most federal jobs… …’The data are not useful for a direct public-private pay comparison,’ says Colleen Kelley, president of the National Treasury Employees Union.”

https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/federal-workers-earning-double-private-counterparts/story?id=11394757

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15) Finally, the discussion so far has only been about government employee salaries and compensation and there’s been no mention of costs for illegal immigration which would take a short book.

But just a taste includes:


15A) California doled out $500 Covid relief checks last spring to 150,000 illegals ($75 million).

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/california-to-give-150000-undocumented-immigrants-500-coronavirus-aid-payments-2020-04-15


15B) California’s budget includes money for free healthcare for illegal immigrants. It’s hard to estimate the total cost, but the state recently added illegals age 19 to 25 to MediCal rolls at an estimated annual cost of $260 million a year.

https://www.pacificresearch.org/californias-free-health-care-for-illegal-immigrants-courtesy-of-the-taxpayers/


California already covers all illegals 18 and under at a cost surely several times the $260 million budgeted for age 19 to 25.

And Gavin Newsom wants to expand healthcare to illegal seniors for another $80 million.

https://www.fresnobee.com/news/local/article239183528.html

All in all MediCal payments to illegals certainly exceed $1 billion per year.


15C) But this is all peanuts compared to cost of educating the children of illegals. There are an estimated 750,000 children in California public schools who have illegal immigrant parents.

http://laschoolreport.com/immigration-fears-in-california-schools-report-shows-1-in-8-students-have-undocumented-parents/

At a taxpayer cost of about $13,000 per student (higher if they aren’t English speaking) California spends at least $10 billion per year on free education for illegal children or anchor babies.

Friday, March 12, 2021

The Bad, the Good, and the Ugly of the Democratic-Biden $1.9 Trillion Stimulus Package

 Click here to read the original Cautious Optimism Facebook post with comments

8 MIN READ - The Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs and Other Egghead Stuff analyzes the bad, the good, and the ugly of the now-signed Democratic-Biden $1.9 trillion stimulus package, focusing on some macroeconomic theory explaining why government stimulus doesn’t assist in recovery (which ironically is the “good” part).

I. THE BAD

CO Nation has a good grip on the bad. The $1.9 trillion spending package is part relief for people thrown out of work by the pandemic and government lockdowns, but the “stimulus” is largely pork programs, political pet projects, and bailouts for profligate state and local governments and public pension funds whose finances were strained even during the boom years before Covid.

Altogether direct check payments, extended unemployment benefits, expanded tax credits, and small business assistance amount to $848 billion or less than 45% of the $1.9 trillion being spent.

Also Cautious Rockers generally get that while many Americans could use relief, the economy itself doesn’t need fiscal stimulus. GDP and employment have already been recovering strongly in concert with the level of lockdown abatement. 

Recently even the business press has been asking if stimulus is necessary given the strength of the most recent economic data: 10% annualized GDP growth in Q1, 379,000 jobs added in February and unemployment down to 6.2% from 14.2% in April.

Note also that no one was arguing a $1.9 trillion stimulus package was so urgent back in July of 2014 when the unemployment rate was also 6.2% under Obama—and declining at a snail’s pace compared to 2020/21.

CO readers are right to be skeptical that the rush to push through a giant stimulus package is little more than a hurried attempt to ensure this particular crisis—which is almost over—doesn’t go to waste, and that a supposedly struggling economy is being used as a pretext to push through as much gravy for politically-connected constituents as possible before the window of opportunity closes.

II. THE GOOD

This is the longest section but may be interesting to anyone who wishes to understand some of the theory behind what helps or hinders economic recovery from recessions.

On the question of “fiscal stimulus” the economics schools are divided roughly into two major camps.

Those for it: Keynesians, MMT’ers, and Socialists—roughly associated with Democrats and Socialists in the USA

Those against it: Austrians, Supply Siders, and most Monetarists—roughly associated with Republicans and Libertarians

The Keynesians argue that the economy needs more “aggregate demand" (spending power from consumers and business) to recover. And that government borrowing and spending money in ways that gets cash into lower and middle-income households’ pockets will produce more spending, thus stimulating the economy. 

If we assume for the moment that under this theory there are no viruses frightening consumers and no lockdowns, the concept is that businesses are reeling, have factories and shops running at only a fraction of capacity (ie. idle capacity), and that once businessmen see consumers spending more they'll respond by hiring more workers and raising operational and capital investment budgets. From there the economy will run strongly on its own.

The Austrians and supply-siders argue that stimulating spending just prolongs what was an original error that caused the recession to begin with. An analogy is helpful here but for two sentences let’s put it in nerdy econ language:

“The unsustainable investment errors made by businessmen during the boom must be liquidated, and physical resources and other factors of production that were misallocated must be redirected to rational business lines that consumers will support under normal economic conditions, not temporarily ‘stimulated’ back to boom levels only to slump right back into idleness once stimulus is removed."

and...

"The market process of reallocation results in some temporary job displacement, but the sooner it’s completed the sooner the economy can resume rational growth based on the consumption and saving decisions of the public instead of distortive central bank policy.”

To explain this in plain English we'll use a good analogy the Correspondent credits to Austrian economic historian Thomas E. Woods using a restaurant.

Take a restaurant owner in a small town doing a steady business.

Then one day the circus comes to town. The circus is an unsustainable boom or even bubble, usually produced by the central bank’s cheap money policy. 

We’ll assume the owner is not an Austrian or supply-side economist, so he’s thrilled to see his store overflowing with new customers: clowns, trapeze artists, and acrobats. Not having enough tables, food, supplies and employees to handle them all, he borrows from a bank and builds a new, larger restaurant right next door and operates both at once. 

This is the pre-recessionary boom.

But then suddenly, as is always the case, the circus suddenly leaves town when the bubble bursts, demand returns to its pre-bubble levels, and now the owner is stuck with a brand new, shiny, expensive second restaurant sitting empty and losing money—what Keynesians call “idle capacity.”

The Keynesian/Democratic line of thinking is for the federal government to borrow and spend trillions of dollars on stimulus—which strangely always takes the form of political payoffs and pork handouts to their friends and constituents—in hopes of getting something like the circus to come back. Then the owner can keep paying workers, ordering food, utilities, and equipment for his second restaurant.

But the Austrians/supply-siders ask “Is putting the second restaurant on life support really good for recovery?" 

We already know the 'second circus' can’t last, and the moment the stimulus runs out the second restaurant, which was never sustainable to begin with, will go empty again only we’ll have trillions of dollars of debt to repay as well.

The Austrians argue building the second restaurant was a mistake to begin with and, as much as we hate to see it idle, there’s no way we can go back to the conditions that prompted its erroneous construction. It was built based on an illusion created by the central bank.

So as painful as it is, resources have to be allocated away from the erroneous investments and back to sustainable ones that consumers will truly support. In other words, liquidation. And the sooner it’s over and done with the sooner the economy can get back to rational, sustainable growth.

Even the classical economists of the 19th century understood that bad businesses started in the mania of a speculative bubble were mistakes and that, painful as it might be, the market must redirect misallocated resources as logically as possible to get on with life.

It’s a tragedy that the central bank directed concrete, steel, and parking lot asphalt to an erroneous project, and some resources like restaurant supply, furniture, and dishware will have to be sold off at firehouse prices (ie. devalued capital). If we’re lucky some ingenious entrepreneur might think of a cheap way to transform the building into a more usable business venue. 

But there’s no reason to keep spending money on extra employees, food, restaurant equipment, and utilities that consumers won’t patronize without the government continuously borrowing and spending trillions of dollars in perpetuity.

If we go reductio ad absurdum to drive the point home: 

If a speculative bubble spurred a businessman to build the world’s largest shopping mall in Antarctica, would it make sense to spend trillions in deficit stimulus every year in the hope of generating enough customers to keep his mall going? 

Of course not. Let’s just admit it was a mistake and stop pouring even more money and resources into it.

OK, now apply the restaurant story to too much commercial real estate in the late 1980’s, or too many useless dot-com companies in the late 1990’s, or too much homebuilding in the mid 2000’s—all spurred by Federal Reserve cheap money bubbles—and apply the same logic. 

Borrowing and spending trillions of dollars to temporarily boost demand for too many strip malls, dot-coms, or houses is simply throwing good money after bad. The moment the stimulus stops, economic reality reasserts itself and the stores, dot-coms, and homebuilders start to lose money and retrench… which they should have been allowed to do from the beginning.

Incidentally this is why every time a round of stimulus money is spent we see headlines that GDP popped up for a quarter or two at most. Then when the stimulus money is gone the headlines report that GDP growth sharply declines and the economy returns to malaise, sometimes with talk of a double dip. We’ve all seen it before.

It’s also why the Obama administration racked up almost $10 trillion in debt during its two terms yet produced the slowest GDP recovery in American history and the second slowest recovery (behind only the Great Depression) from a financial crisis to full employment.

So taking medicine tastes bad and liquidating mistakes that can’t be sustained isn’t fun, but it’s necessary. Just as a hangover after a drinking binge is no fun, but it’s a necessary part of the body regaining its health. Austrians argue that following the Keynesian prescription—chasing the hair of the dog (drinking more alcohol to cure a hangover)—might feel better in the short term, but it only delays the necessary solution and at far greater cost.

III. SO WHAT’S GOOD ABOUT THIS STIMULUS?

What we’ve described with our restaurant example is a classic recession—irrational misallocations of resources incited by central bank easy money such as the slumps of the early 1970’s, early 1980’s, the late 1980’s post-S&L Crisis recession, the 2000-02 dot-com recession, and the 2007-09 Great Recession.

But 2020 is different.

In early 2020 there were very few massive misallocations of resources spurred by the central bank that failed en masse just waiting to be logically reallocated. The economy was functioning rather well, but it was artificially placed in a coma by a virus and lockdowns.

So what the economy needs today is to be freed—vaccines, herd immunity, and whatever else it takes to lift government restrictions and give consumers the medical confidence to resume their pre-Covid economic behavior.

And although the economy certainly doesn’t need stimulus, perhaps now you can see why government deficit spending won’t be as harmful this time around: there are no major resource misallocations for the government to perpetuate with its spending. Barring a new virus, the Fed jacking up rates to 10%, or an unexpected event like war, the economy will rebound very nicely all on its own once the virus is controlled and lockdowns ease.

So the good is the stimulus won’t have the opportunity to do as much damage to the recovery as it has in conventional recessions. At most it might produce an uptick in inflation, but not another 2008-15 malaise or three Japanese “lost decades.”

(BTW the correspondent is not ruling out *other* anti-growth initiatives that might come later from Congress and the White House, but history shows it's going to take a lot of really bad ones to stop this recovery)

IV. AND FINALLY, THE UGLY

The ugly part, other than the wasted money and pork handouts, is mostly rhetorical.

Time and again governments have tried stimulus measures to end conventional recessions only to prolong the slumps instead. 

Japan has tried stimulus more than anyone in world history and has three lost decades of sub 1% economic growth to show for it, and a giant debt to boot—the equivalent of a $55 trillion national debt in the United States.

Herbert Hoover and FDR tried the greatest Keynesian stimulus in the history of the United States and it took 17 years to get to full employment (if you include World War II when 12 million men were drafted and artificially removed from the workforce) along with the worst economic contraction in American history.

And we already mentioned the failure of Obama’s stimulus spending and deficits.

Yet Keynesians, who every time promised rapid recovery, backtrack in the wake of each failure with another “the stimulus just wasn’t big enough” or “we underestimated how bad the economy was” or “well, it would have been even worse without the stimulus.”

Never mind every recession before 1929, where fiscal stimulus was not only not tried, but didn't even exist as a policy yet, recovered years faster than 1929, 2008, or Japan’s three lost decades. The Depression of 1920-21, which was the second sharpest contraction of the 20th century, was over in 18 months and full employment attained in two years (precisely why it's not in the history books) while President Warren Harding’s administration did nothing other than cut the government budget.

But in 2021 we have an economy that is going to recover strongly on its own, and in fact already has when compared to the depths of last spring’s blanket lockdowns. 

Yet President Biden and the Democrats are about to borrow and spend $1.9 trillion anyway, and afterwards Keynesians will claim it was the stimulus that produced the recovery. “See, when you’re willing to employ a large enough stimulus the economy recovers quickly” they will say. “This proves Keynesian stimulus works.”

Hopefully Americans will be smart enough and have long enough memories to recall that, six months before the stimulus was even signed when lockdown measures were already being loosened, unemployment had already fallen eight points (14.2% to 6.2%) and GDP was growing at an annualized rate of 10% in early 2021 and even 33% in the third quarter of 2020.

But the Economics Correspondent suspects that won’t stop Keynesians from trying anyway. If they haven't given up after expensive failures in the 1930’s, Japan, and 2008, what makes anyone think they’ll stop this time?

Monday, March 8, 2021

San Francisco Puts Homeless in Parking Lot Tents: For $61,068 Per Tent

Click here to read the original Cautious Optimism Facebook post with comments

From the Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs and Other Egghead Stuff.

$16 million for 262 tents.

It's gotten so bad that two of the San Francisco Board of (eleven) Supervisors actually asked about the cost last week.

ps. Some of the $1.9 trillion stimulus package will no doubt go to shore up the budget in Nancy Pelosi's hometown.

Read details at:

https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2021/03/04/san-francisco-pays-16-million-to-house-homeless-in-tents/

Saturday, March 6, 2021

Free vs Regulated Banking: Scotland’s Free Banking Era (Part 2 of 4)

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6 MIN READ - The Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs and Other Egghead Stuff gets to the heart of financial stability under Scotland’s free-market banking system of 1716-1845, when regulated England suffered from ten crises and unregulated Scotland experienced none.

Contemporary account of the English and Scottish
experiences during the Great Financial Crisis of 1825

III. OVERISSUANCE, RISK, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

From 1716-1845, Scottish banking operated in the closest to a laissez-faire environment the industrialized world has ever seen.

There was no central bank. There were no government privileges, protections, or barriers to entry. Banks were free to issue their own notes and lend any share of their reserves they chose. There was no deposit insurance, there were no bailouts, and failed banks that could not pay off depositors made up the difference from their owners’ pockets (ie. full liability).

Critics of capitalism contend that under such a system unregulated banks, left free to their own devices, will leverage themselves to the hilt, issue too many risky loans through notes and deposits, and their recklessness will bring the entire banking system down in crisis.

Yet Scottish bank failures—especially due to overleverage—were rare and credit quality was excellent.

The reason once again was unfettered market competition, unmarred by government-granted privileges, monopolies, backstops, and restrictions that are later called “the free market” by politicians after they’ve created full-blown crises.

Unlike in England there was no monopoly central bank to overextend or rapidly contract credit for the entire system, and any private Scottish bank that issued too many banknotes had to worry about large quantities of its notes returning for redemption and depleting its specie reserves. 

The private clearinghouse networks also settled mutual banknote obligations daily, so any bank felt the consequence of overissuance very quickly. Once again, absent bailouts from central banks and central governments, it was precisely market competition that kept the banks prudent.

Adam Smith, himself a Scottish resident of Edinburgh, marveled in “The Wealth of Nations” (1776) how effectively the threat of redemption and workings of the private clearinghouse systems kept banks honest. 

Clearinghouses even set standards of financial soundness for banks to become and remain members, and they established accounts for member banks to maintain a minimum balance so that in the unexpected event of failure their liabilities to other banks would not go fully unpaid. This reserve account mechanism was quite effective at stemming the contagion of panic if a large bank failed since other banks it owed to were protected with what were effectively escrow accounts.

Unlike in England Scottish banks were free to widely branch and diversify their depositor bases and lending portfolios.

Also given that there was no central bank standing by to make emergency loans, no government bailouts, and no deposit insurance, banks had great incentive to lend to only the most creditworthy clients and promising enterprises. 

Furthermore most Scottish banks operated in a full liability environment. If enough of a bank’s loans went bad and depositors were not fully paid off, the difference came out of the owners’ personal estates.

The Economics Correspondent is no expert on liability and imagines there are many advantages to our present system of limited liability that promote economic growth. However there can be no doubt that having their own assets at stake proved very effective at focusing the banks’ owners like a laser on sound lending.

Finally, while the Bank of England dominated English finance and diverted funds to the Crown for war, leaving small English country banks to scrape up what little capital they could muster, larger Scottish banks were concerned with the needs of commerce and contributed greatly to the nation’s economic development. 

In 1745 Scotland’s per-capita GDP was only half that of England’s. 

A century later it was equal to that of England’s.

Considering England itself was undergoing the first Industrial Revolution and an unprecedented expansion at the time, the pace of Scotland’s economic growth must be considered all the more impressive as Adam Smith also noted and credited largely to the free banking system.

IV. STABILITY IN SCOTTISH BANKING

But undisciplined by the omniscient wisdom of government regulators, didn’t Scottish banks still lower credit standards, lend recklessly, and spawn constant banking panics like the 2008 financial crisis? After all, we’re told by politicians, regulators, academics, and the media that a private, competitive system left to its own devices is a recipe for disaster and collapse.

As we’ve mentioned in previous columns, not a single systemic banking crisis struck Scotland during its 129 years of free banking. 

By contrast England, dominated by a monopoly central bank and hobbled by Six Partner Rule regulations that kept private banks small, weak, and undiversified, suffered from at least ten banking panics during Scotland’s free banking period: in 1721, 1745, 1772, 1783, 1793, 1797, 1810, 1815, 1825, and 1837.

During the tumultuous period of wars with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, 300 English banks failed in the thirty years between 1791 and 1821. 

Scotland was tranquil by comparison. Of the joint-stock banks that dominated the market, not a single one failed in the even wider forty-year span of 1786-1826. What few failures did occur were limited to a handful of small private non-issuing banks—on average one per decade (versus one hundred per decade in England).

During the English Crisis of 1825, the largest banking panic in British history before 2008, 80 banks failed in England and 700-800 more appealed to the Bank of England for assistance which was effectively every bank in the country. In Scotland only four banks were even impacted, all smaller houses. One was acquired by a larger bank, two paid their liabilities in full in 1825 and 1826, and only one outright failed in 1829.

J.R McCulloch, heir to the Ricardian school after David Ricardo’s death, wrote in 1826 of Scotland’s “comparative exemption of this part of the empire from the revulsions that have made so much havoc in England.”

And as we’ve noted in previous chapters on England, conservative Prime Minister Lord Liverpool and future Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel urged their parliamentary colleagues in 1826 to consider the free banking system in Scotland as a model for England’s post-1825 crisis reform. Peel even noted in House of Commons debate that 300 English banks had failed in the previous thirty-three years while he could only find a single Scottish bank failure on record in the same period.

Another large panic struck England in 1837 and even spread to the United States which, with its own perversely regulated system (more on that in a future column), suffered the American Panic of 1837. Yet Scotland, even sitting on England’s border with a tightly integrated economy and common currency union, was again unaffected and its resilience once more did not go unnoticed.

Economist Robert Bell recorded in 1838 “While England, during the last year, has suffered in almost every branch of her national industry, Scotland has passed paratively uninjured through the late monetary crisis.”

And economic historian William Graham noted in 1911 that “In the heavy losses and banking failures [of 1837] which ensued, Scotland had little share.”

Scotland’s crisis-free record is particularly impressive considering its close economic ties to its much larger neighbor. A major banking crisis in England could more easily spread to the north than a Scottish crisis could destabilize the south, yet the Scottish system was so durable that it was practically immune to English dysfunction with a sole exception (the 1797 suspension) that we’ll examine in a future installment.

So the British experience completely contradicts the conventional wisdom that unregulated banking leads to industry recklessness and crisis while government regulation promotes stability.

Scotland’s zero crises during its 129 years of free banking stands in stark contrast to regulated England’s ten crises during the same period. And the reasons aren’t hard to understand once the history is unveiled.

In Part 3 we’ll talk about what few regulations did exist in Scotland, its few isolated bank failures, and the end of the free banking era.

Thursday, March 4, 2021

Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Hails Denmark's $22/Hour Wage at McDonalds, Omits $15 Bacon Sandwich Meals and Kiosks Replacing Humans

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The Cautious Optimism Correspondent for Economic Affairs and Other Egghead Stuff noticed Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez recently called a $15/hour minimum wage a "compromise" since she says Denmark's McDonalds workers make $22/hour and get six weeks of annual vacation.

AOC’s ghost writer tweet can be read at:

https://twitter.com/aoc/status/1366922134057058304

Since then the future House Speaker has been slammed by pundits over two errors:

1) Denmark has no statutory minimum wage. However it does have plenty of pro-union laws and the unions have secured higher wages for low-skilled workers.

2) Many European countries with high minimum wage make exceptions for younger workers, who tend to be even less skilled. In the Netherlands, for example, a 15 year old can be paid 2.92 euros per hour ($3.50) even though the adult fulltime minimum wage is 9.72 euros ($11.66) making *it* the compromise, not $15 (see Netherlands minimum wage schedule at the bottom of this post).

But AOC picked the most favorable country for her case from the over 40 in Europe and with a population smaller than metro Atlanta.

However the Correspondent has yet to see an even bigger glaring error in her reasoning being reported.

Simply going on Google Maps and looking at customer/tourist photos of McDonalds locations in Denmark discloses the consequences of such generous pay raises (see photo).


In the top photo the store menu reveals if you want a chicken sandwich meal with a small (what they call medium) fries and drink it will cost you 75 kroner or about $12.50USD. 

If you want the double bacon sandwich large meal (what we call medium) it's 88 kroner or just shy of $15.

And these photos were taken in 2018. 

The Correspondent hasn't been to a McDonalds for a while. He lives in San Francisco where he's seen the phased $15/hour minimum wage close down several McDonalds locations, as well as IHOP, Panera Bread, Burger King, Subway, and countless local restaurant names CO readers would probably not be familiar with.

But he suspects if one walks into a McDonalds in say, Texas (a state that abides by the federal minimum wage of $7.25/hour) the menu wouldn’t read $12.50 for a small chicken sandwich meal or $15 for a double bacon sandwich meal. In fact the Correspondent found a 2017 San Antonio Google Maps photo with a $6.09 Big Mac meal.

The Correspondent would also wager once the price is raised to $12.50 or $15, a lot of Texan McDonalds customers will quickly pay a whole lot fewer visits—as will Georgians and Iowans and the residents of dozens of other states—and the rapid contraction in demand will mean a lot of workers have less work to do and lose their jobs.

Which leads us to the bottom tourist photograph. Denmark has already shown us what's in store for the human cashiers in U.S. McDonalds if AOC gets her way.

ps. Every tourist photo the Correspondent found of a Danish menu board had zero human employees standing in front of it at the counter. In fact, human employees were rather scarce in all the photos as were customers. Probably not a coincidence either.

(Netherlands minimum wage schedule last updated for 2021)

https://www.government.nl/topics/minimum-wage/amount-of-the-hourly-minimum-wage