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6 MIN READ - By tackling this subject the Economics Correspondent is straying a bit from the current series’ core topic of Chinese history.
However there is a connection to our previous columns. The atomic bombings quickly ended the war in China along with the mass killing of millions of its civilians.
Our last article’s subject—General Douglas MacArthur’s decision to grant immunity to Unit 731 scientists, a notorious Japanese biological weapons program based in China that committed horrific experiments against live civilians—in exchange for their research is also tangentially related.
Today many critics slam MacArthur and the United States as greedy biological weapons peddlers when in fact the immunity deal’s real motivation was a threat by Japanese scientists to hand over their data to the Soviet Union if they were prosecuted.
Likewise President Harry Truman is criticized as wicked for ordering the needless use of the atomic bomb.
As the topic still remains controversial today, as opinions vary even within CO Nation, and as Cautious Optimism doesn’t censor civil discourse, comments and opinions are welcome.
IMPERIAL JAPAN IN MID-1945
Whenever debate resurfaces over America’s decision to use the atomic bomb most Americans maintain the view it was a tragic but necessary evil to end World War II quickly.
The Japanese not only refused to surrender, they also employed the “Shosango” strategy of bleeding the U.S. with massive casualties to discourage invasion of the home islands in hopes of a more favorable negotiated peace. Furthermore the Japanese war cabinet’s later plan “Ketsugo” was inspired by the ancient bushido code, preferring to fight fanatically to the death over surrender while ordering millions of Japanese civilians to either die in battle or commit mass suicide.
But the Economics Correspondent has also heard plenty of condemnation of America’s use of the bomb, usually by far-left “America is evil” liberals, or from “always blame America” styled libertarians. To support these denunciations the critics have offered up a litany of reasons why dropping the bomb was not only unnecessary but also an immoral act since, according to them, there were better options available to the Allies that would have achieved peace with far less loss of life on both sides.
The Correspondent wishes to address these criticisms, none of which he believes hold merit with one possible exception on practical grounds which he’ll discuss in the last installment.
We’ll start this first column with the single most complicated criticism to rebuke:
1) “Dropping the bomb was unnecessary because Japan was just about to surrender. Harry Truman used the bomb anyway because he stubbornly insisted on nothing short of unconditional surrender.”
This argument is usually rebuked by people who remember that Japan still refused to surrender even after Hiroshima was destroyed by the “Little Boy” atomic bomb. If the Japanese government was one breath away from surrendering before Hiroshima, why did it refuse to surrender after?
Historians have also long known that after the second atomic attack on Nagasaki and Soviet declaration of war on Japan, the imperial cabinet was still divided fifty-fifty on the question of surrender. After a stalemate Emperor Hirohito finally stepped in and broke the deadlock, ordering Japan’s capitulation to avoid, as he stated in his surrender radio broadcast, “an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation.”
This small fragment of history alone dispels the myth that Japan was just one breath away from surrendering before the Enola Gay destroyed Hiroshima.
But there’s more evidence, perhaps less commonly known, that disassembles what is effectively the “just about to surrender" fable.
Let’s start at the beginning.
By the summer of 1945 the Japanese war cabinet knew they were losing badly, but the so-called “Big Six” cabinet members—comprised of the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, War Minister, Navy Minister, and Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff—wanted to achieve a face-saving resolution that offered favorable terms to Japan.
U.S. President Harry Truman demanded an unconditional Japanese surrender, but one high ranking Japanese official devised a compromise suggestion which he floated by the Big Six. Lord Privy Seal Koichi Kido, one of Hirohito’s more dovish advisors, proposed the following counteroffer of revised surrender terms to the Allies, dubbed the "four conditions”…
1. The Emperor shall retain his throne as head of state.
2. No war crimes trials will be conducted.
3. No Allied soldiers shall set foot on Japanese soil.
4. The Allies will not disarm the Japanese military. Rather, the Japanese military will disarm itself.
There was a fifth condition that wavered slightly and is not part of the bigger four:
5. Japan will keep all of its conquered territories.
However at times Kido considered concessions on this last condition including one that Japan might consider returning “former Western colonies,” implying the relinquishment of Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines (which Japan had already effectively lost), Burma (also effectively lost), and possibly Vietnam and Indonesia.
Anyone reading the “four conditions,” with or without the fifth, can tell it was not a surrender.
It was a ceasefire proposal, and one with no change in the Japanese war government’s disposition, no accountability for any war crimes, no respite for the hundreds of millions of Asian civilians still suffering under Japan’s murderous occupation, and in practice no enforceable disarmament.
And despite such ridiculously favorable terms for Japan, the Big Six rejected Kido’s proposal for being too generous to the Allies.
So much a second time for the “just about to surrender” legend.
(the Economics Correspondent recommends CO readers consider a simple Google search on “Japan four conditions” to corroborate these little know surrender terms)
Nevertheless the Emperor asked Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo to contact Moscow and probe Soviet willingness to act as mediator for prospective peace talks with the Allies.
Unbeknownst to Japan, Joseph Stalin had already committed to break his neutrality pact and invade Manchuria, a pledge he made to late U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt going back to the Cairo and Yalta Conferences. Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov stretched out peace discussions using delay tactics, giving Japan false hope with no intention of ever brokering a peace.
After the revelation of the atomic bomb and August 6th destruction of Hiroshima the Japanese war cabinet reconvened to discuss their deteriorating position. Kido floated his “four conditions” surrender idea again. They were completely unchanged from his first proposal.
Once again the Big Six rejected the terms.
And once again, the “Japan was just on the cusp of surrendering before Hiroshima” fable is refuted.
So much too for the “Japan only objected to unconditional surrender” argument, since they also objected to war crimes trials, military disarmament, any Allied presence on Japanese soil, and giving up their conquests in China, Korea, Taiwan, and conceivably other countries.
And all this after Hiroshima.
On August 9th the “Fat Man” atomic bomb destroyed Nagasaki while the Soviet Union simultaneously invaded Manchuria, overrunning Japan's dilapidated Kwantung Army.
The war cabinet convened yet again. Given the increasingly hopeless prospects for face-saving peace, the subject of unconditional surrender was finally discussed seriously.
Yet the Big Six were still divided, deadlocked three against three.
Despite the total destruction of two cities, the threat of more atomic bombs raining down on Japan, the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, prospects of the USSR invading Sakhalin Island, the Kuril Islands, and Hokkaido (the first two ultimately materialized, the third did not), War Minister Korechika Anami, navy chief Soemu Toyoda, and army chief Yoshijiro Umezu still argued for fighting on.
On the possibility of Japan being completely destroyed by atomic bombs War Minister Anami argued the complete annihilation of the Japanese race was preferable to the dishonor of surrender.
Reflecting the fanaticism of the bushido code prevalent in WWII Japanese militarism, Anami likened the extinction of all Japanese people in nuclear fire to a delicate flower wilting in the flames of an inferno. “Would it not be wondrous for this whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower?” he asked.
The cabinet ultimately reached an impasse.
Side note: Five days later Anami signed the instrument of surrender aboard the USS Missouri and committed seppuku suicide the next morning.
From here the story becomes better-known again. The emperor stepped in to break the deadlock, ordering an unconditional surrender.
Deferring to the infallibility of imperial edict the cabinet complied but managed to preserve a single condition that the emperor remained head of state. Luckily for both the war cabinet and citizens of Tokyo—which Truman considered as a target for the third atomic bombing—the Allies accepted the sole remaining condition.